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Reviewed by Louis Midgley

Directions That Diverge:
"Jerusalem and Athens" Revisited
There is nothing so painful to anyone as is separation
from Athens and one another, for those who have been
comrades there.
Gregory of Nazianzus'
Within the "limits of reason" one can create a science,
a sublime ethic, and even a religion ; but to find God
one must tear oneself away from the seductions of reason with all its physical and moral constraints, and go
to another source of truth. In Scripture this source
bears the enigmatic name "faith," which is that dimension of thought where truth abandons itself fearlessly
and joyously to the entire disposition of the Creator:
"Thy will be done!"
Lev Shestov (1866-1938)2
I do not know. That may sound like a profession of
ignorance that would constitute my closest possible approach to Socrates, but it is more plausibly understood
as an admission of incompetence. Only rarely does
Quoted from Gregory's Carm;no (Poems1 2.211-64, in laros lav
Pelikan, Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Th e·
ology ;n 'he Christian Encouflltr with Hellenism (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1993), 175.
2
Lev Shcstov. Athens and Jerusalem, trans. Bemard Martin (Athens,
Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966),67-68.
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incompetence ever stop anybody from anything, and it
will not stop me.
Werner J. Dannhauser3

The ten essays by Hugh Nibley included in The An cien t State
appear to be scholarl y treatises on lopics like education, or o n
rhetoric and its corrupti ng influence on ancient and modern civj·
lizalion, or on ancient statecraft and its related ideology and sup-

porting rituals. and so fort h. These essays are certainly not con ventional o r even arcane scholarship fashioned for the sake of a

struggle for tenure, promotion. and an academic career. Th e
essays assembled in The Ancient State are not unlike NibJey's
other efforts to exp licate Mormon things by means of inte llectual
hi story-whatever e lse they appear to be, they are apologet ic
"Mormon essays." F ro m my perspective this is a strength- they
are part of Nibley's larger effort to defend the gospel of Jesus
C hrist agai nst its critics.
Though Nibley occas ionally emp loys bot h the product a nd
the authority of philosophical inquiry as a tool in defense of d ivine special revelatio ns and hence as an element in his effort to
warrant faith in God as revealed in the scriptures,4 hi s scholarl y
endeavors const itute intellectual hi story (which is often coupled to
stingi ng social criticism) ; they are not genuine ly philosophical,
since he already begins with the understanding of the objects or
contents of faith as revealed by God.
Instead of commenting on the full range of essays found 10
The Allcient Stare, as tempting as that might be, I will focu s exclusively on two essays written in 1963 and publi shed in this bo ok
for the first time nearly three decades later. N ibley first set forth
his schema in lectures en titled "Three Shrines: Mantic, Sophic,
and Sophistic" (pp. 311 -79) delivered on I, 2, and 3 May 1963
3
Werner J. Dan nhauser, "Athens and Jerusalem or Jerusalem and Ath·
ens"!" in Leo Strauss and Jud(Jism: jerusalem and Athens Critically Rel'isited. cd.
David Novak (Lanham, Md. : Rowman and Littlefield. 1996). 156.
4
A fine ellample can be fou nd in Nib!cy's essay entitled "Goods of First
and Second Intent." in Ar'proaching Zion, ed. Don E. Nonon (Salt Lake Ci ty:
Deseret Book and FARMS, 1989),524-53. The title and the structure of Nibley's
analysiS in this essay are borrowed from Book XII of Aristotle's Metaphysics
and then put to use in cxplicati ng and defending a morality grounded in divine
speci al revelations.
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at Yale University,S (At approximately the same time he drafted a
manuscript entitled "Paths That Stray: Some Notes on Sophic and
Mant ic," pp.380-478). In these essays he depicts what he argues
was an old but also cont inuing struggle between the quest for or a
claim to a wisdom available through human reason and a longing
for a wisdom that comes from another world .
Nibley compared and contrasted "two basic human attitudes"
(p. 315), which he also described as addict ions (p. 319). expectations (p. 314), hopes (p.317), traditions (p.319), or inclinations
(p. 331). He called these att itudes mantic and sophic. The term
mantic. which will be recognized in the name "praying mantis"
(Mantic religiosa)-an insect that holds its forelegs in a position
suggestive of hands folded in prayer-is a Greek word identifying
the prophetic, that is. the words of those claiming to be in various
ways the spokesmen for the will of God (propheroi). Both mantic
and sophic attitudes are, it turns out from Nibley's perspective,
thoroughly religious even when their advocates disdain that label.
Nibley found evidence in Greek literature, and especially in the
poets. for these two contrasting and competing religious dispos itions. He also sketched the presence of sophic and mantic moods
in the literature of both classical antiquity and the modem world .
Though Nibley focuses on Greek literature and religiosity. the
New Testament also displays something simi lar to what he describes as contrasting sophic and mantic attitudes. I will demonstrate that the products of these longings and expectations either
constitute or flow from the competing claims to wisdom now
widely symbolized by Jerusalem and Athens. I will also show that
the literature on this confrontation of religious attitudes bolsters
and also corrects some of what Nibley has written on these issues.

Foolishness or What?
In the New Testament we find the claim that "God was
pleased through the foolishness of what was preached" concerning Jesus as the Messiah or Christ "to save those who believe,"
even though "the world through its wisdom did not know him "
( I Corinthians 1:21 NIV). Many who heard the prophetic message
5 The original subtitle for these lectures, '1l1e Confrontation of Greek
and Christian Religiosity," was not included in the published version.
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concerning Jesus Christ, of course, rejected it. AI least part of the
reason for this rejection, accord ing to the Apostle Paul, was that
the Greeks turned instead to their own "wisdom" (v. 22).6 From
this and similar remarks, it appears that at least some of the Greeks
seemed to Paul 10 have been charmed by pagan philosophy, that
is. they were enthralled by the wisdom of this world. Paul thus
ridiculed a life dedicated to philosophy, one endeavor for which
the ancient Greeks are still very much celebrated.
Paul thus insisted on a radical disjunction between "the wisdom of God" made available through Jesus Christ (and supporting special revelations) and the "wisdom" that some of the
more sophisticated Greeks were then apparently demanding . But
the quest for worldly wisdom, it turns out, constituted a life driven
by a noble effort to acquire knowledge of the highest or divine
things by reason alone. Something like Paul's radical separation
between opposing truth claims Wa'> later set forth by the first
prominent Latin Christian writer, the remarkable Tertullian (ca.
A.D. 160-225),7 in a famous enigmatic question : "What indeed
has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between
the Academy and the Church?"S
It seems that Tertullian read Paul-and I believe correctly-as
yearning "to confound even philosophy itself. For (philosophy)
it is which is the material of the world's wisdom, the rash inter·
preter of the nature and the dispensation of God:>9 In setting
forth his argument, Tertullian pointed to the "unhappy Aristotle

6
See 1 Corinthians 1:17-25 and compare 2:6-16. The closest parallel
in the Old Testament 10 Paul's contrast between the world's wisdom (or philosophy) and divine wisdom manifest in Jesus Christ is found in language in Isaiah
which indicates that, when God seeks to "do mal"'ielous things with this people,"
then ·'the wisdom of their wise men shall perish, and the discernment of their
discerning shall be hid" (Isaiah 29: 14 RSV). But [his passage cannot be read as a
criticism of the pursuit of knowledge by unaided human reason, but only as a
warning against the employment of something like skill or cunning in governing human affairs apart from genuine obedience 10 the will of God.
7
His full name was Quintus Septimiu5 F10rens Tertullianus.
8
D~ praescriplion~ Juur~/icorum 7.9. This essay can be found in English
translation as ·'On Prescription against Heretics:· in Anlt-Nic~n~ Falh~rs, vol.
3, La/in Christianity: liS Founder, Terlullian, cd. Alexander Roberts and James
Donaldson (lS85; reprint, Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1994),246.
9
Ibid .
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... who inve nted for these me n dialectics. the art of building up
and pulling down " among those he saw advancing an ultimately
and radica lly corrupt ing worldly wisdom (or philosophy). But his
primary target was the Academy, which was, incidentally, an effort
to revive a school originally founded by Plato. Tertullian specifi ·
cally mentions Platonism and "Plato's schooJ,"IO which may
have been for him either Alexandrian Platonism or the incipient
Neoplatonism attributed to Ammonius Saccas,ll who is sometimes
thought of as the founder of this school. Be that as it may, Tertul·
lian 's position on the danger to Christian faith found in the
teachings of Platonism (and certain other philosophical schools)
seems clear: "Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Chris·
tianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition! "12
My first encounter with Tertullian's stu nning contrast between
what he cons idered the wisdom available from God through in·
spi red men-prophetic wisdom-and the teachings of pagan philosophy came when I heard Hugh Nibley read an address entitled
"Prophets and Philosophers" over KSL, a Salt Lake City radio
station, on 16 May 1954, on what was then the regu lar 9:00 P.M.
Sunday evening LDS radio program. 13 Nibley quoted passages
from Tertullian that illustrated at least some early Christian qualms
about philosophy.
Th ough noting that "the subject of philosophy" was one with
which he was "not competent to deal,"14 Nibley indicated that he
10 tbid.
II See ibid., 175-235.
12 Ibid. "What is there, then. about them that is alike, the philosopher
and the Christian-lhe disciple of Hellas and the disciple of Heaven-lhe dealer
in reputation and the dealer in salvation-one occupied with words and one with
deeds-one creator of error and its destroyer-friend of error and its foe-the
despoiler of truth and its restorer-its robber and its warden?" (Tertullian ,
AIJoJogy 46.18).
13 See Nibley's "Prophets and Philosophers," which was the tenth in a series of radio addresses initially circulated in pamphlet form under the title Time
Vindicates the Prophets (Salt Lake City: The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, 1954). and then published as chapter 5 in The World cmdlhe Propht/s
(Salt Lake City: Deseret Book. 1954). 35-36. 39; and currently available both
in audiotapes from FARMS and also in an expanded edition in the CoUtcud
Works of Hugh NibJey (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book and FARMS, 1987),
3:39-40. Subsequent citations are from the 1987 version.
14 Nibley, The World and Ihe Prophels, 33.
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would, instead, report the opinions of some of the earliest Christian writers o n the encounte r of the fa ithful with the teachings of
pagan philosophers. This then constitutes the content of Ni bley ' s
essay on "Prophets and Philosophers," as well as part of additional re marks concerning phi losophy found in portions of The
Wo rld and the Prophets. IS

The Famous Question
It turns o ut that Tertullian 's famous eni gmatic q uest io n is still
very much with U5. 16 There is a recent, sizeable. and soph isticated
literature that attempts in o ne way or another to dea l with it. 17 We
15 Ibid., I I. 44-62, 71-97, 100-102, 107.
16 Though some writers would deny this. Some of this literature provides a
thorough and carefully documented and hence rather useful account of biblical
materials seemingly drawn from or perhaps merely similar to the literary forms
and language of pagan philosophical and poetic litcrature. Abraham J. Malherne's Paul and the Popular Philosophers (M inneapolis, Mi nn.: Fortress, 1989)
provides a model of careful scholarshi p on this issue. Malherbe notes that "one
could have begun a recitation of denials of philosophic infl uence [on the New
Testament) with Tcrtul1ian's question, which calls for the reply that Athens has
nothing whatever to do with Jerusalcm. Tcrtullian, of course, was intcrested in
preserving what was distinctive about the Christian faith" (p. I). Malherbe,
unfortunately, does not contrast philosophy, understood as a way of life, with
prophe tic faith. He therefore brushes aside Tcrtullian's question on the assumption that it is merely a rhetorical flourish and that, hence, nothing much
is behind it. For other similar studies, sec Laneelot A. Garrard, A/hens or
Jerusalem? A Study in Chris/ian Comprehension (London: Allen and Unwin,
1965), or E. G. Weltin, A/hens mui Jerusalem: An Interpretive Essay on Chris{ianiry and Classical Culture (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1987).
17 If the authors have foots in Roman Catholicism, then what one finds is
a concerted effort 10 justify the large role traditionally occupied by phi loso phy
in medieval Roman Catholic theology or an effort to rcach a synthesis between
Jerusalem and Athcns in which philosophy has a significant place. See, for example, Jack A. Bonsor, Athens mui Jerusalem: The Role of Philosophy in Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1993), or Stephen R. L. Clark, From A/hens /0
Jerusalem: Tire Love of Wisdom and Ihe Love of God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).
Jewish authors who have approp ria(cd Athens and Jerusalem as symbols standing for something li ke reason and revclarion (or faith) havc sometimes merely
deseribed efforts of medieval Jews to find a pl3ce wi thin their own faith for at
least some of the teac hi ngs Ihey found attractive in pagan philosophy. Sce, for
example, Y3acoV Shayil, Athens in Jerusalem: Classical Antiqui/y (uui 1Ic/lenism in the Making of Ihe Modern Secular Jew, (rans. Chaya Naor and Niki
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are certainl y entitled to ask: Was Tertullian right when he argued
that the claims to wisdom sy mbolized by Athens and Jerusalem
are not equivalent or commensurate? Are they, instead, when
properly understood, dissimil ar and competitive? And, if Tertul ·
lian was in some fundamental way right, how can one justify (o r
even account fo r, apart from an apostasy) the appropriation by
Christian theo logians of the categories and explanations, and not
mere ly some of the vocabulary, of pagan philosophy? And how
can one justify the work of those who fashioned the great ecumenical creeds that have subsequently more or less defi ned God ?
These creeds employ categories borrowed from or controlled by
pagan philosophy. Yet they are found in the more sophisticated
versions of orthodox Catholicis m and Protestantism to the perhaps
surprising inclusion of the Protestant evangelical or fund amen·
talist faction.

"Jerusalem and Athens" in Recent Jewish Thought
If Nibley has not seen himself as competent to deal with ancient pagan philosophy in more than rhetorical and histori cal
ways, is there someone from whom we might begin to glimpse the
intellectual horizon of pagan philosophy, who could also assist us
in refl ecting upon its possible impact on the life of communities
claiming 10 mani fes t prophetic fa ith ? I believe there is such a one.
I have in mind Leo Strauss ( 1899-1973), an influential Jewish
philosopher whose celebrated lecture entitled "Jeru salem and
We rner (London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1997). or Jacoh
Ncusner. Jerusalem ami Athens: The Congruity of Talmudic ami Classical Philosophy (Leiden: Brill. 1997); John J. Collins, Between Athens and Jerusalem:
jewish Idellliry in the Hellenistic Dinspora (New York: Crossroad, 1983). Other
Jewish writers have take n seriously the opposition of the two as set forth by
Tertu1li::m and have passionately rejected philosophy or the quest for wisdom
apart from the divine revelation as fou nd in the Bi ble. See Shestov, Athens ami
Jerusalem, for an example of this literature. Others stress the tensio ns as they
siruggle to lind a synthesis between the two. See, for example, Paul Eidelberg,
jerusalem liS. Athens.' In Quest of a General Theory of Existence (Lanha m, Md. :
University Press of America. 1983). Finally, volumes of essays like that edited
by Novak, Leo Strauss and Judaism, manifest differen t degrees of anguish over
whether to turn (or return) to Jerusalem (and what is believed to be divine re velation) or to continue to grasp At hens (and be salisfied wit h merely the lo ngings
for human wisdo m).
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Athens" first appeared in 1967. When I discovered this lecture in
book let fo rm, lS J was fascinated by its somewhat en igmatic contents. Here was an atheist Jew, or so I supposed,19 deeply involved
in explicating and defending ancient philosophy against certain of
the excesses of modernity (that is, modern , as opposed to premodern. notions of the limits of rationality). And yet he also had
much to say about the confrontat ion of two competing claims to
wisdom that he, sile ntly following Tertullian, symbolized as Je rusalem and Alhens. He did not, as one might have expected, just
assume that even his own brand or understanding of philosophy-which was deeply indebted 10, if not identifi ed with, what he
believed was ancient philosophy properl y understood-necessarily had the fmal word.
I was led to opine about Strauss and what I cou ld make of his
arcane remarks regarding the eventual impact of the quest for
knowledge by reason alone on the faith of Jews and hence on
their commitment to the Bible and their fidelity to its moral demands. 20 Whatever his own personal predilections might have
been, Strauss seemed to me to have steadfastly and correct ly left
open the question of whet her a life focu sed on faithful obed ience
18 Leo Strauss, Jerusalem and Athens: Some Prelimirwry Reflections (New
York: City College of New York, 1967). This was the inaugural lecture in a series
on Judaic affairs honori ng Frank Cohen. It is con ve niently reprinted in leo
Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philorophy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1983). 147-73; as well as in Leo Strauss. Jewish Philosophy and
the Crisis oj Modernity: Essays and Lec/ures in Modern Jewish Thought, cd.
Kenneth H. Green (Albany: State University of New York Press. 1997).
377-405.
19 There is a complicated and passionate debate among the followers of
Leo Strauss on thi s issue. See, for example. the various essays included in Leo
Strauss's Thought: Toward a Critical Engagement, cd. Alan Udoff (Boulder, Co.:
Rienner, 1991 ), those in Novak, cd.. Leo Strauss and Judaism, and some of the
essays included in Leo Strau.u: Political Philosopher and Jewish Thinker, ed.
Kenneth L. Deutsch and Walter Nicgorski (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefi eld. 1994). See also the introductions to the two volumes of Strauss essays
ciled in note 18 above and various essays cited by Kenncth H. Green in his Jew
wu1 Philosopher: The Return to Maimonides in Ihe Jewish Thouglrl oj Leo
Strauss (Albany: Stale University of New York Press, 1993).248-64.
20 See Louis Midgley, 'The City Dod Philosophy : Leo Strauss and the
Question of God." in TO ....'(Jrd (I Humanistic Science oj Polilics: Essays in HOIlQr
oj Francis Dunham Wormllfh, ed. Dalmus H. Nelson and Richard L. Sklar
(Lanham. Md.: University Press of America. 1983), 23-50.
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to God or a life dedicated to the quest for knowledge by unaided
human reason was the proper way to live. He also brushed aside as
unworthy choices other ways of living on the grounds that those
who followed them were oblivious to the evils that haunt human
nature and afflict this world or they were inattentive to the noble
possibilities within. And he seems to have insisted, silently echoing
Tertullian. that no synthesis was ultimately possible between the
claims of 1erusalem and those of Athens.
Quite unlike Nibley, Strauss saw himself as engaged in a radical quest for knowledge by unaided human reason; he was thus a
philosopher even or especially when he was engaged in composing histories of ancient or modern philosophy, and also when he
was dealing with the claims he symbolized by Jerusalem and
Athens. Precisely because of his own commitment to the philosophic life-to the quest for knowledge by reason alone-it is possible to draw upon his account of ancient philosophy with some
confidence that his writings can assist us to begin to understand
the inner structure and hence charms of that world. Grasping
philosophy in its nascent forms may facilitate our own effort to
clarify exactly how and why the commitment to the philosophic
life may challenge the faith of communities grounded on prophetic truth claims or may corrupt and transform the faith of
those who see themselves as guided by the Bible.
Strauss seems not to have mentioned that it was Tertullian who
first used the symbols of Jerusalem and Athens to identify competing claims to wisdom. nor did he draw attention to Tertullian's
wrilings. 21 The reason may have been that he was Jewish and
Tertullian was Christian. To me, Strauss seems to have been at least
somewhat contemptuous of Christian theologians. 22 Why? Because they were not Jewish? There seems to have been a somewhat
deeper reason. From his perspective, Christian theologians were
21 Werner Dannhauser is the only student of Leo Strauss I have found who
even mentions Tertullian as the "origin of ... 'Athens' and 'Jerusalem' as symbolizing the diffcrences between reason and revelation." Dannhauser, "Athens
and Jerusalcm or Jerusalem and Athens?" 170 n. 12, citing Tertullian's De
fraescriplione Haerelicorwn 7, and also Hany A. Wolfson's famous The
Philosophy of the Chun.:h F(lthers. 3rd. cd. rev. (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard
Univcrsity Press. 1970), IOUf.
22 I either agree with Strauss on this matter or I attribute to him my own
bias.
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too anxious to draw upon pagan teachings: they rushed into the
arms of philosophy, perhaps without knowing what they were
doing. They did not comprehend the ten sions between the two
claims to wisdom. In their understandable desire for the polemical
weapons they CQuid borrow from pagan sources and their equally
understandable desire to fashion a systematic, rational structure
and support for their faith, they either knowingly or perhaps
unwittingly ended up corrupting their faith . They also garbled
what they borrowed from pagan sources by turning it into a set of
dogmas rather than understanding that it is a radical quest for
knowledge and hence a way of life rather than a specific Icaching
or set of finished dogmas.
When Jews like Moses Maimonides (1135-1204)23 eventually
took an interest in pagan philosophy, they never forgot that it was
dangerous both to themselves and also to the faith of the community they loved and in which they lived. They often thought that
much of what they really believed ought to be concealed from the
uninstructed or vulgar. They understood that what they had appropriated from pagan sources was profoundly threatening-at
least to the faith of uninstructed believers (that is, to most of those
in their own faith communities).
Strauss wrote as if the practice of contrasting Alhen's wisdom
(understood as ancient pagan philosophy) with Jerusalem's (or
divine revelation) was the intellectual property of Jewish writers
and hence not Christian at all. What he did not acknowledge publicly was that his own favorite way of contrasting what he saw as
the tensions between what appear to be radically competing claims
to wisdom had its origin with a remarkable Christian writer.

23 For a simple but useful account of the dependence of Maimonides on
Aristotle, "the only master {in philosophy) he recognized," see Abraham J.
Heschel. Maimonides: A. Biography. trans. Joachim Neugroschel (New York:
Doubleday, 1991), 25. For an introduction to Strauss on Maimonides. see his
"How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed," in Strauss, Uberalism: A.ncient and Modem (New York: Basic Books, 1968). 140-84; compare Strauss,
"On the Plan of The Guide of the Perplexed." in Harry Austr)'n Wolfson: Jubilee
Volume on the Occasion of His Seventy·Fijth Birthday (Jerusalem: American
Academy of lewish Research, 1965). 2:775-91. See also Strauss, Spinow's
Critique of Religion, trans. E. M. Sinclair (New York: Schocken Books, 1965).
For a useful commentary, see Green's Jew and Philosophu.
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Is Nibley's soph ic, from the perspective provided by the
treatment of Jerusa lem and Athen s by Strauss, just another name
for ancient pagan philosophy? I believe that what Nibley calls
sophic is what Strauss (and his many disci ples) most emphatically
associate with philosophy understood in its ancient form. Ancient
philosophy is perhaps best known and accessible to us in the
popular teachi ngs of various Epicureans and Stoics, and then in
the Neoplatonic elements found at the heart of Augustine's highly
influential Chri stian "theology."
Augustine does not seem to have described himself as a theologian, but rather seems to have favored the label philosopher. In
Books IV and VI of hi s fa mous City of God he introduces the
Christian world to the classification of theology known at least
within the Stoic school of philosophy. Following the famous Stoic
philosopher Varro, Augustine distinguishes political (or civil)
from poetic theology and condemns both as absurd and unseemly. But in stead of then introducing a presumably revealed
theology, Augustine again follows Varro and describes instead
"natural theology," which turns out to be what philosophers, and
spec ifically what he, believed were Pl ato's views concerning divine
things. He obv iously understood that natural theology was the
work of various philosophers attempt ing to discover divine things
by reason alone. Augustine argued that Plato, as he understood
(or, more likely, mi sunderstood) him, drawing upon Neoplatonic
sources for hi s command of Plato, provided a necessary intellectual grounding fOf a mature Christian faith. It also seems that
Augustine saw Christian faith, when properly understood, as somehow ri sing above what one might find even in the Neoplatonism
with which he was familiar. But one way to read the scriptures was
through the lens of Neopiatonism. If we accept Augustine's own
account of his conversion to Ch risti anity as set forth in his ConJessions, the role of Neoplatonism seems to have been crucial in his
coming to see that God is incorporeal. This also seems to account
for his favorable remarks concernin g the Neoplatonist manifestations of natural theology that he sets forth in the City oj God.
If something like thi s is true, are we not then, in the final
analysis, still forced to deal with the issues raised by Tertullian,
only now under a somew hat different set of labels? The efforts of
Leo Strauss to sort out and assess the merits of the competing
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claims to wisdom sy mbolized by Jerusalem and Athens are thus, I
will strive to demonstrate. potentially useful for Latter-day Saints.
But to see exactly why this is so, we must examine Nihley's early
essays on the mantic and sophie.

Nibley on "The Confrontation of Greek and Christian
Religiosity"
As early as 1954, Nibley argued that "the unique thing about
Mormonism is that it is a nonspeculative religion in a world of
purely speculative religions," From hi s perspective.
that remarkable characteristic establishes at once the
identity or kinship of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints with the original, primitive Christian
church, which in ancient times also had the unique di stinction of being a nonspeculative religion in a world
completely "sold" on philosophy.24
In this early distinction between speculative and nonspecu lati ve
religions we seem to have access to a key element in what Nibley
later claimed is the struggle between religion that is either dominated by sophic or by mantic components. Once such a distinction is clearly in mind, it is possible to begin to trace the dialogue
between those alternatives among the ancients and also in the
modem world, especially among a cuhural Mormon fringe group
cUlTently operating on the margins of the Mormon intellect ual
community.25
As is well-known, Nibley has long been engaged in the
corroboration of prophetic wisdom, or of what he also labels
24 Nibley, " Prophets and Philosophers," 33.
25 In a number of essays I have dealt with the appropriation by cultural
Mormons of ideologies nowing from Enlightenment skepticism concerning
divine special revelations. These folks tend to question or deny the miraculous
and hence strive to explain the prophetic truth claims which both ground and
form the content of the faith of Latter·day Saints in secular, naturalistic terms.
Sec, for example, Louis Midgley, "Atheists and Cultural Mormons Promote a
Naturalistic Humanism," Review of Books on the Book of Mormon 7/1 (1995):
229-97 ; and Louis Midgley, "A Mormon Neo·Orthodoxy Challenges Cultural
Mormon Neglect of the Book of Mormon: Some Renections on the 'Impact of
Modernity.'" Review of Books 011 the Book of Mormon 612 (1994): 283-334.
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"nonspeculative religion ." As part of the historical clarification
and vindication of prophetic religions, he contrasted the claims of
the vast array of teachings generated and maintained by the host
of often competing philosophers, theologians, mystics, officers, reformers, scholars, and preachers26 with the essentially nonspeculative manifestations of mantic religiosity. The latter rest, among
other things, on the attitudes and yearnings of people interested in
(or at least open to the possibility of) a wisdom from another
world-people who are thus open to divine special revelations.
Nibley can be read as arguing that, by focusing on the distinction between sophic and mantic, we can begin to move beyond
the more traditional discussions of such seemingly enduring issues
as the confrontation of reason with revelation, or of science with
religion. Both of these he pictures as later and confused offspring
of an earlier confrontation between two different claims to wisdom. and hence two different types of "religion," at least when
viewed through his sophic-mantic (or philosophic-mantic) lens .
That this is possible can be seen when we sense that the mantic.
which is more difficult to identify clearly than the sophic (or philosophic) quest for wisdom, seems most accessible to us when \\e
focus on the desire for prophetic truth claims that are more or less
linked to the Bible. (In the case of Latter-day Saints, they are also
linked to the Book of Mormon and other revelations.) Similar
yearnings are found in some but of course not all expressions of
Jewish, Christian, and Muslim religiosity. Nibley also sees mantic
yearnings at work in much of Greek literature, poetry, and religion. and even standing behind Near Eastern cuhures until
"around 600 B.C.," at what he likes to call, appropriating a label
from the French scholar Lasaul, "the 'Axial Period' of world
history ."27 (The phrase is also discussed by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers .)
How does Nibley distinguish mantic yearnings and the resulting manifestations of religiosity from the stress on rational
26 Various chaplers in Nibley's The World and Ihe Prophels are devoted to
each.
27 Hugh W. Nib1cy, Since Cumorah. 2nd ed. (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book
and FARMS. 1988), 239 (originally published in book form in 1967). Nib1ey
seems to hold that civilization as we know it was originally grounded on and
expressive of mantic longings.
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specuJ alion--on theoria (or Iheory)-Ihat constitutes both the
substance and gro und of sophic relig ios ilY? In 1967 he briefly
alluded to Erwin R. Goodenough's rather offhand reference to a
distin ct ion
in Judaism between the "horizontal" and the "vertical" types of religion, Ihat is. between the comfortable
and conventional religion of forms a nd observances as
opposed to a religion of revelations. dreams. visions,
and constan l awareness of the reality of the other world
and the poverty of thi s ane. 2a

Nib ley then ind icated that he had previously "ca ll ed th is the conflict between the 'sophic' and the 'mantic,' a nd ," he added, "i t
goes back to the earliest records of Greece and the Leva nt. "29 He
identified a quest in ancient Greece for a wisdom throug h una ided
o r unass isted hu man reason that yie lded- to use Imman uel Kan t' s
much later fo rmulation- a " re li g ion within the limits of reason
a lone,"30 which itself called into question and strove to replace
the earlier mantic reli gious substratum . S uch essentially re lig iou s
celebrations of skept ic ism and rationalism Nibley called sop hic.
He thus contrasted a "smug ' horizonta l religion' with ... its utter
con tempt fo r visionary prophet s"31 with a longing for a wisdom
that comes from or that disc loses another world . And he held th at
one can fin d this goin g on in Greece and Egypt, as well as in
Palestine. Following the terminology he first introduced in 1963,
Nibley thu s described a dialectic between the sophic (or philosophic) and a contrast ing yearnin g for the mantic, or a stru ggle
between horizontal and vertica l Iypes of re ligios ity. Are these
affirmations, we may ask, equi valent, commensurate, and ha rm on i-

28

Ibid., 241. Goodenough's remark can be found in his Jewish Symbols
1: 17- 22: now
avail<lblc in an abridged edition. with a foreword by hcob Ncusncr ( Princeton:
Princeton Unive rsity Press. (988). 20-23.
29 Niblcy, Since CUII/orah. 241.
30 Immanuel Kant. Religion within Ilrl' Limits oJ Re(ISOn Alone, 2nd ed"
trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper :md Brothers.
1960), from Immanuel Kant's Religion innerlralb der Grenzerr der blossen Vanrmft (Konigsberg: Nicolosian, 1793).
3 1 Nibley. Since Gil/norah, 241.
ill Ihe Greco-Roman Period (New York: Pantheon, 1953-68).
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ous, or are they, if not simply contradictory, at least competitive?
He insists that the two are at least competitive, just as Leo Strauss
saw tensions and even radical contradictions between what he symbolizes as Jerusalem and Athens.

Wisdom, Wonder, and Wayfaring: Sophic and Mantic
Addictions
An important discussion has been taking place both within
and outside Latter-day Saint circles on the confrontation of the
wisdom sought through unaided human reasoning and the wisdom that has presumably been revealed by God through prophets.
If we think of those two claims to wisdom as forming the basic
foundations of Western civilization, which I do, then this discussion takes on an added importance. And if one is concerned about
the confrontation of Mormon things with modernity, as I am, then
taking part in the conversation is crucial, and that necessitates getting clear on the historical background of the discussion, thereby
bringing these issues into focus and providing the proper bearings
so that we can sort them out.
What Nibley labels as sophic yields an understanding resting
entirely on the resources of the human mind, or, more narrowly, it
consists of the quest for wisdom through unaided human reason.
By contrast mantics long for at least some glimpse of the meaning
of the magnificent and also tragic drama within which they tend to
see themselves. We should not, however, assume that Nibley has
ever been anxious to defend from criticisms all manifestations of
mantic longings. Unlike some of his early efforts to vindicate the
prophetic, in Nibley's treatment of these longings we see him at
work describing both the virtues and vices of the mantic. And he
likewise does not shy from noting the virtues of sophic endeavors.
Nibley drew his categories and descriptions from the vocabulary in which such things were discussed by ancient Greeks. That
has certain advantages. By so doing, he avoids imposing modern
categories upon the past, as would be the case if he had addressed
what he calJs the "old donnybrook between science and religion"
(pp. 380-81). Instead, he borrows ancient categories with which
he eventually strives to understand the modem world. He argues,
much as Leo Strauss did, that our current way of seeing things is a
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confused outgrowth of old, and now half-forgotten, quarrels. His
approach requires the reader to acquire a subtle new vocabulary; it
also demands that we avoid jumping to conclusions.
Nowadays we like to contrast science and religion. or reason
and revelation, or facts with faith. And given the charming ideologies of secular modernity, when such amorphous and yet simple
binary sets come to define the alternatives, it is not difficult to
imagine which one will have a political or rhetorical advantage.
We are, for example, often easily persuaded to see a contest between science and religion, with the word science presumably
identifying the solid rational position, while religion is reduced to
vague feelings, mere sentimentality, or raw emotion. if not to
myth, magic, or superstition. Even among Latter-day Saints, some
today feel the need for talk about divine things to appear credible
or be vindicated in the light of the currently fashionable notions
of science. When this is the case, what is labeled science clearly
tends to call the tune. But the quarrel between science and religion
is not what is directly at stake in the confrontation of sophic and
mantic attitudes.
Even in The World and the Prophets, Nibley did not address
exclusively the quarrel between science and religion, though it was
mentioned here and there in that book. Instead, he argues that the
old donnybrook can be better understood when examined historically, when we know something of its roots and contours over
time. When this is done, it turns out that the quarrel is derivative
and also confused, at least partly because it turns out to be a byproduct of a more fundamental and earlier confrontation between
what Nibley labels sophic and mantic.
And it is not that one of these two presumably competing expectations, attitudes, or claims to wisdom is "religious" and the
other is not. For it turns out that the choice between sophic and
mantic necessarily commences before the grounds for either alternative can be made entirely evident, and hence involves hopes,
longings, assumptions, ~nd beliefs. In a broad sense both are thus
"religious," and both are expressions of "faith," though with
radically different and even contradictory contents. Those whose
attitudes can be described as sophic-whose way of life rests entirely on the resources of the unaided human mind, of reason
alone, or who may be involved in a quest for knowledge of First
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Thin gs by unaided human reason-are " religious," even when
they tcnd to reject Ih is labe l. 32 It also turns out that both are necessarily articu lated, exp licated, and defe nded with words and
hence involve argumcnts. Thus both are at least in that sense rational. It is a serious mistake to see one as rational and the other as
irrati onal. as some have do ne.33 for both have elements of what
can be ca lled the rational and nonrational.
For there to be gen uine faith-a rare thing indeed. accordi ng
to Nib ley-I he possibilities of a wisdom from other worlds must
be understood unequi voca ll y (or literally); otherw ise sophic assumptions dominate. What this means is that much of the world's
pious reli giosity, accord ing to Nib ley, is not genuinely mantic at
all, si nce it is made to rest on the currently accepted intellectual
fash ions and involves in one way or another sophisticated equivocations abou t divine things. It turn s out that hostility to even the
possibil ity of wisdom from other worlds fuels one or another of
the host of rationalizing naturalistic ex planations of mantic longings and also of prophetic truth claims.
These essen tially naturalistic exp lanations are sophic precisely
because, among other things, they demand a closed universe of
what they see as the natural and hence rule out in advance the possibi lity of other worlds. They are also sophic because they rely
ultimately on reason alone or the unaided resources of the human
mind. The post-Enlightenment tendency has been for those represent ing what they understand as the correct and controlling intellectual currents to find in the science of the day either a surrogate
fo r faith (hence often called "sc ie nti sm"), or to appeal to the
mystique and authority of science. They thereby transform science into a secular religion. But it is hardly irrational or antiintellectual to avoid such dogmatic sc ienti sm.

32 Marxists and some other nat uralistic humanists steadfastly reject the
label religion when it is applicd to their own ideology and dogmas. For a criticism of this rhctorical practice. see Midgley, "Atheists and Cultural Mormons,"
246-51 .

33 The other slogan commonly used to gain a rhetorical advantage by
those charmed by sophic (or sophistical) claims to wisdom is the charge that the
mantic is anti· intellectual. Whenever one sees Ihat charge being directed at an·
other pany. one can expect 10 be treated to an exereise in propaganda and not to
carefully worked-out arguments.
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Whatever ils charms, by itself the sophie is. from Niblcy's
perspective, ultimate ly destructi ve. for it demands mag nanimit y
(mega/op.\'ychia) and hence breeds what we know as pridc. 34 And,
for the mantic, pride is lethal. From Nib ley's perspective, a bout
the only thing in which we can appropriately and genuine ly exce l
is repentance (when that is g rou nded in trust in di vine mercy);
everything e lse is a potent ial trap capable of decoyi ng us away
fro m di vine things and into a world in which " reli gio n" is debased as it becomes another commod ity to be adverti sed and merchand ized.

There have been, of course, accordi ng to Niblcy, many attempts to find a synthesis or harmonization between the sophic
and mantic. That sort of thing has been the business of swarms of
populariz ing preachers and rati ona li zin g theologians and other
fas hionab le intellec tua ls. Nib ley treats such endeavors with scorn ,
describing them as soph ist ical and often me rely rhetorical, even
when they manifest considerable in genuity; he st rives to demonstrate that they corrupt and weaken what is ge nui ne in both the
sophic (or philosophic) and mantic; they tend to blur and obscure
the real alternat ives. In fact, they both cause and now from co nfusion over the real alternatives.
From Nibley' s point of view, there are on ly two ways between
which we must choose, and phantas ms result fro m attempts to mi x
or blend the two or when we do not con fr ont clearly the radical
cho ice we must all face. He there fore di stingui shes between the
prophetic, o racular, and inspired, on the one side, and essentia ll y
natura listic accounts of "reli gious" things, on the other. The one
attitude is mantic, whi le the other is sophie, This distinction places
theology, traditionall y understood as rat iona l specu lation about
34 Consider the following: ·'It is commonly believed (h,Lt humblcness is :I
precondition of wisdom. Thi s opinion is rejected hy the I'!hilnsophic Ir:ldilion
going h:lck :It le:lst to the PI<.Itonic Socr:ltes. Neither Plato nor Aristotle include
humblencss :lmong the virtues. True. in the AJlology (20-23), <.IS ;n other PI:ltonic dialogues, Socr;lles readily I'!rofesses ignor:lllee. But this is not (IIUIL '(I so
much as irony rooted in (restrai ned) skepticism."' And "in Ari~totlc 's NicOl/!m'JII'(1I! flhic.f (I 123b-1 124a), IIwgalopli)"C"hia. translated as "m:lgn:lI1 imity"
or "pride:' is referred to as the adorn ment of lhe virtues. The proud or gre,,!souled mlm is one who thinks himself worthy of gTCilt things. especially
honor- not OUI of conceit but from a ju st estimate uf his me rit and desserts."'
Eidelberg, )..,11$(11.'/11 I'S. Ari1(ms, 48- 4lJ.
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divine things, squarely within the realm of the sophic, And hence
Nibley is not interested in doing theology; he abhors theology ,
whether dogmatic or systematic, including that done by Latter-day
Saints,35
Nibley thus describes what he sees as the corruption of the
mantic tradition brought on by its marriage to philosophy in the
Christian world of Origen, Minucius Felix, Justin Martyr, and especially Augustine. 36 The union between Christian faith and pagan philosophy lurns out to have been a kind of shotgun wedding,37 Why was faith in Jesus as the Messiah or Christ, when
guided and directed by divine revelation, not sufficient? Why was
philosophy needed to support faith ? Putting the question in a
different way, Nibley asks,
why was the marriage with philosophy necessary? Answer: "To overcome the objections of reason to revelali on"-that is St. Augustine's famous reconciliation of
Classical and Christian learning. But how can you call it
reconciliation when it is always the church that gives
way? It is always reason that has to be satisfied and
35 I first encountered Nibley's antipathy toward what he called "speculative theology," as opposed to divine revelation or what he caned "the apocalyptic," in a lecture he gave on 27 November 1956 entitled "Types or Varieties of
Christian Theology," delivered at Orson Spencer Hall. University of Utah. He
argued Ihat theologians atlempl to feel their way along by turning a little bit of
information, some of which is drawn from divine special re velations, into a systematic or scientific compre hension of God. They all end up engaging in the
same task, teaching the same things, and using the same or very similar arguments, which they often borrow from pagan philosophers, sometimes without
genuinely understanding the medium in which they are busy trafficking, The
problem is that information about divine things, even or especially when we
take seriously divine reve lation, is inadequate for a systematic account of all
reality, and hence we end up supplementing and then replacing what has been
revealed with speculation grounded in "the unaided powers of the human mind,"
36 See Nibley's Tile World and 1M Prophets, especially the essays entitled
"Prophets and Philosophers," 33--43; "The Prophets and the Search for God,"
53-62; "51. Augustine and the Great Transition," 80---t!8; and "A Substitute for
Revelation," 89-97.
37 Others have described simi lar and, from my perspective, equally unfortunate weddings between philosophy and faith that took place within medieval
Jewish and Islamic communities. Leo Strauss and somc of his disciples have had
much to say about these developments.
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reve lalion that mu st be manipulated in order to g ive
that satisfaction; Ihis is no compromi se but complete
surrender, by which Theology " becomes the train bearer of the Old Queen Phil osophy." (p. 367)38

In this and other similar passages, Nibley describes whal he
believes was the e nd result of attempts to draw upon the sophie as
a way of supponing an original and now saggi ng mantic tradition.
if nOI 10 find a place within the soph ie fo r some elements merel y
drawn from the earlier mantic foundations as recorded in the sacfed scri plUres. But in suc h sc hemata it is always either the
grounds or contents of faith that are adjusted to the c urre ntl y
fa s hi onab le demands of reason. And w hen these effo rts m ore o r
less take hold, the earlier mantic traditio n is thereafter seen
through a. le ns provided by the newfangled sophic rationalization
of the con te nts o f the scri pturcs. 39

38 Thus Nibley complains about what he sees as unfortunate efforts to
reach what he calls an "accommodation" between mantic and sophic (p. 367).
39 Something like this can be seen in the efforts to justify the obvious use
by churchmen after the third century of pagan philosophical categorics to sc t
forth and defend va rious unde rstandings of divine things. Subsequently the language and understanding of the resulti ng theology has provided the lens t hrough
which the Bible has been read by those professing the creeds. For an instructive
recent example of an effort to read back into the scriplures notions fashioned in
the fourth century by uninspired and apostate churchmen. see James R. Whitc,
The Forgollen TrinilY: Recovering Ihe Hearl of Chri.Sliafl Belief (Minneapolis.
Minn.: Bcthany House. 1998). White argues that the study of history can be
useful in shedding "much light on the doctrine of the Trinity," but only if we do
not attribute any real authority to it (p. 177). lie simply ignO/es the fact that
both theological formulations and creedal statements sporling language aboUi
the nature. essence. being. or substance of God (coupled with efforts to distinguish the Fathe r. Son. and Holy Spirit by calling them "persons") were clearly
drawn from and deeply impacted by PJgan philosophy. For him. those churchmen who fashioned the creeds were merely looking for a more precise language
with which to support what they thought were aut hentic bibl ical teachings.
White then reads back into the Bible his understanding of what was fashioned in
the fourth and subsequent centuries as churchmen fought ovcr the proper understanding of the Trinity. He seems unaware that he reads the Bible through t he
lens of subsequent theological developme nts :md controversies that clearly
ma nifest the innuencc of sophic pride nod nothing of divine inspi ration or revelation. Those churchmen who crafted thc creeds and those theologians who fashioned explanations of the Trini ty were nnxious 10 deny such inspiration. Sec
also White'S recent venture into anti-Mormonism enti tled I.f Ihe Mormon M)'
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In hi s exam inat ion of sophic and mantic, Nibley is cen ainly
not setting fo rth a distinction that can somehow be transformed
in to a key to a metaphys ics (an understanding of nature or be ing)
that he somehow th inks stands behi nd true religion; it is precisely
that kind of ph ilosophical en terpri se that he sees as soph istical, if
not gen uinely sophic. It is therefore a mi stake to understand or
red uce what Nibley does with sophic and mantic to the categories
derived from or attributed to Greek ph il osophy. Nibley is not
attempti ng to figure out an ontology or provide a metaphysics.
From hi s perspective. to attempt to do that (and especially fo r religious purposes), whatever else might be said about it. would co nstitute a vain and fru itless exercise in soph ic pride. It shou ld be
reme mbered that. from Nib ley's perspective. genui ne manifestations of prop hetic religion are embedded in narratives and are essentially practical or moral, and not speculat ive or theoretical, as
such things are understood from withi n the horizon of ancien t
Greek philosophy. What God desires from us is fa ithful response
to his message, not clever specu lat ion. He requests a broken heart
and contrite spirit, repentance understood as a change of hean. or
a turn ing or retu rni ng to hi m witnessed by our obedience. We are
to fl ee from Baby lon and make genu ine efforts to bu il d Zion. 40
In attempting to clarify ceTlain fundamental alternatives by
prob ing a past that was then and there, Nibley calls attention to
what he sometimes describes as "the spl it between rationalists and
believers."41 This split poi nt s to or involves a contest over the
question of what constitutes the proper or highest way of li fethat is, over the prope r mode of " religion." In such endeavors,
Nib ley is not engaged in theology-either systematic, natural, o r
dogmat ic-but in essenti ally hi storical exp lications of meanings
and poss ibi lities .

Brother: Discerning the Difference.r be/ween Mormonism tmd Christianity
(Minneapolis. Minn.: Bcthany House. 1997). Mr. White. much like other earlicr
anti-Mormon lumi naries. now SpOTlS a ncwly minted "doctoratc" in "theology"-which actually amounts to a cenification of his obvious ferocious
polemical skill- from the unaccrediled Columbia Evangelical Seminary. at
which he is also one of the ""faCUlty."
40 This can be seen in some of Nibley's more recent work. See. for e;ll;am·
pIc. thc essays asscmbled in his Approaching Zion.
41 Niblcy. Since Cumorah, 240.

L

48

FARMS REVIEW or BOOKS [ I I I ( 1999)

Such an approac h has merit. Other than d irect contact with divi ne things, our understanding of suc h rests o n ilCCOUn!S of God' S

mighty acts and man's halting responses that are contained in
tex ts. That is. it is found in the wrillen word, which is o ur tiny window 10 the pas!. This helps ex pl ain Nibley's concern with what is
contained in and can be deri ved from ancient texts.
Both sophie and mantic involve various longings, hopes, a nd
expectations; they constitute alternati ve approaches, styles, or
stages which even some of the most disparate commun ities share.
Neither sophie nor mantic is a single enti ty, and hence, when diffe rent versions confront eac h other. they tend 10 recognize the
simil arit ies and the common ground upon which the ir competing
claims are made to rest; they also tend to become petul ant toward
those who seem to share a simi lar te rritory.42 Jewish, Islamic, a nd
C hristian be lievers, from Nibley's perspecti ve, consti tute in an important and obv ious sense a single mantic " People of the Boo k,"
despi te having so metimes differen t and even co ntrad ic tory unde rstandings of the book (or eve n d ifferent books). Whatever the
confrontatio ns a nd quarre ls between the ad he rents of diffe re nt
strands or modes of mant ic tradition, the more fundame ntal contest turns out to be between sophic and mantic, and not the sophistic corru pt ion of both resu lting fro m attempts at a synthesis or
blend of the two.
The dialectic between sophic and mantic, though accessible to
us through a study of the past, shou ld not be thought of as me rely
a matter of an tiquarian curios ity, fo r something like it can be seen
he re and now, even among the Latter-day Sai nts. For example, th e
principle behind the writing of some recent Mormon hi story42 Much of sectarian anti-Mormonism is grounded in what might be called
the narcissism of small diffe rences. Anti-Mormons. precisely because they are
anxious to speak for and sell thcir product to one or anothcr of the compCling
and contentious brands of nineleenth-century Protestantism. have bccome aware
that the Church of Jesus Christ of Laller-day Saints offcrs a coherent and allr:lClive al ternative to their own ideology. Sectarian anti-Mormons presumptuously
:lrrogate to thc mselves the role of autho ritative gatekeepers of what they imagine has always been Christian orthodoxy. This is possible because they lend to
dcny Ih~t Christianity has a genuine. rich. and dillerse history- in which their
p~rticul:lr narrowly constricted heresy is but one in a long line of competing
efforts 10 preserve some semblance of the fruit of the prophetic charisms obvious in biblical tex ts.
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which has been desc ribed as "Revi sionist" (or, more vaguely, as
"New Mormon Hi story")-is that historians ought to strive for
neutral ity or scientific objectivity, or what is sometimes called balance or detachment , as they deal in "human or naturalistic term s"
with the Mormon past. 43 What seems to be an essentially sophistic
if not genui nely sophic hope is found among those who hold that
hi story and culture can be furthered by the employmem of naturalist ic ex planation s of what they label "the Mormon myth ."44
In that way some hope that Mormon culture and hi story can be
"h umanized" without complete ly disabling the traditional account of the church's origin . Of course, those enthralled by such
an essentially sophistic agenda like 10 picture theirs as the genuinely "scie ntific" attitude, or at least as detached, critical, balanced, neutral, objective, secular, and rational. They may grant
thai even though full objectivity is impossible. such is still a worthy ideal that can be more or less approximated, for they assume
that there are degrees of neutral ity or detac hment. And they imply
that they have these in large measure .
For some with rev isioni st procli vities. any sign of faith in God
may be seen as a corrupti ng bias. In addition , some historians
continue to assume that the truth about what really happened in
the past makes itself known, in sofar as it can be known, only to the
ex.tent that even vestigial elements of faith are shed . In that way
the mantic elements of Mormon faith are managed and manipulated. As one writer concl uded: "subservience to a particular
43 Leonard 1. Arrington, '·Scholarl y Studies of Mormonism in the Twen·
tie th Century," Dialogue III (1966): 28. Arrington's language was the n qUOIed
by Moses Rischin. a non· Mormon. in a brief review of essays on the Mormon
past that appeared in a popular magazine. See Rischin, 'The New Mormon HislOry:' Tire American Wesl 6/2 (March 1969): 49. From this ralher casual little review, the expression ··New Mormon History" eventually beeame an ideologicat
bludgeon in the hands of various revisionists and diss idents.
44 This language was again introduced by Arrington, who expressed the
desire to justify natu ral istic explanations of "what may be called ·the Mormon
myth'·' or ·'certain historic themes sacred to the memories of the Latter-day
Saints:' which ·'may not appeal to the rational faculty of the majority as an objective picture of the world abou t us." This language is found in the prefilce to hi s
Greal Basin Kingdom ( 1958; reprint, Lincoln: Uni versity of Nebraska Press,
1966), xi. Arrington reaffirmed his fondness for naturalistic explanations in a
book entitled Mormons and Tllei, ffistorians (Salt Lake City: University of Utah
Press, 1988), 131- 32.
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religion is therefore incompatible with honest inquiry, whether by
historians or by anyone else."45

Such approaches seem rhetorical and dogmatic. And from
Nibley's perspective they are also essentially soph ist ic. Such for~
mulalions, graced with the protean expressions subservience and
particular religion, suggest a distinction between serv ile attention
to the spec ial tenets of a particular faith (or rel ig ion), presumabl y
including that of the Sai nts, which is then set over against neu-

trality, detachment, and objcctivity~a kind of presumably rational
(and hence sophic) "reli gion in general." From suc h a perspective the trappings of convent ional religion aTe not ent ire ly jettisoned, but properly subordi nated to a currentl y fashionable and
regnant sc ientism.
At the present time it is unfortunately still common for a few
secu larized historians to praise detachment, and, in the binary opposition thus implied, 10 eschew attachment to a particular faith.
A ll of this fits rather nicely within what Nibley describes as soph ic
(or even the sophistic); the end result has been that some writers
want 10 "disti nguish studies which lend to be basically 'fa ith promoting' from those done in 'secular' graduate schools w hich
insist upon naturalistic or humanistic description and analysis."46
Given that distinction, it turns out that much of Mormon hi story
has been routinely dismissed by some as "basicall y faith-promoting." Hi storians like Nibley are, of course, apologists in the sense
that they both defend the faith and tend to be sy mpathetic with the
mantic tradition. BUI, if Nibley's analysis is at all sound, we are all
faced with a choice between co mpet ing religious faiths, and there
is no neutral or hi gher perspective from w hich to judge the co mpeting claims. In addition, it turns out that all accounts are "fa ith promoting" in the sense that they all must necessarily rest upon
or support either one or another of the various sophic or mantic
hopes and longings. Or they may exemp lify the confusion of the
two that Nibley labe ls the "sophistic junk yard."47
45 James L. C layton. "Docs History Undermine Faith?" S!ln5/Olle. MarehApril 1982. 34.
46 Arrington, "Scholarly Studies." 18 n. 12.
47 Nibley, '1llree Shrines." 356. A striking e~amp le of such rationalization of divine things is found in the efforts on the fringes of the Mormon
intellectual community to understand Joseph Smith's prophetic truth cla ims.
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Neither the soph ic nor manlic constitutes a si ngle claim to wis~
dom. For example, philosophers squabble; they are divided inlo
competin g schools, brands, or varieties of philosophy. One fash·
ion in phil osophy foll ows and competes with another. To label
something sophie, as Nibley does, is not to imply that there is a
sin gle ontology or body of knowledge or a single claim to wis~
dom known by that name, or anything like a sing le metaphysical
stance. Likewise, the longing fo r a mantic wisdom, presumabl y
flowin g from another world, also comes in different and co mp e t ~
ing shapes and varieties. Unlike the hi storica l arguments found in
'J1le World lind the Prophets, which are intended to vindicate the
prophets both ancient and modern, Nibley's argu ments on sophic
and mantic do not lead to the conclusion that every manifestation
of the one or the other is sound or authentic.
Sophic and man tic are both open to excesses, corruption, and
distortion. In addition, according to Nibley. even as yearnings, the
presence of the one may act as a correcti ve for the abuses or
excesses of the other. Western civ ilization can be seen as at least
partially the product of the confrontation of these two seemingly
different and competin g claims to wisdom. and hence also with
various effons of the one to challenge or accommodate the claims
of the other. In the end, however, instead of calling for a balance
between the two or a synthesis. Nibley makes it clear that he sides
with the mantic. despite all of its actual or potential abuses. From
his perspective there is no genuine middle ground between sophic
and mantic. and no higher ground from which it is possible to as~
sess competing claims.
Nibl ey tends to avoid the designation sophistic, and uses, in stead, the term sophie as his designation for the employment of
unaided human reason in the quest for knowledge of highest or
First Things. He al so tends to skirt the word philosophic, th oug h
he grants that the word sophie, albeit present. was much less co m~
mon in the ancient Greek world than either sophistic or philoso·
phic. All three terms are versions of what was called "wi sdom ." A
including the Book of Mormon. as "the Mormon myth." Acting as clandesti ne
theologians. a few revisionist historians have tried to distinguish actual history
(what they assume can be proven 10 have really happened) from what they see as
the encoding of Mormon faith in myth-that is, in so·called "sacred narratives"
in whic h the dh'ine is imagined to be part of the slory.
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phil osopher. from Pythagoras to the present , is a lover (phi/os) of
wisdom (sophia), By tu rni ng his foc us on the word sophie, ralhe r
than on philosophic, Nibley avo ids having to determine exactly
what is going on among those known as philosophers as thcy
attempt to deal with d ivine things.
He th us ski rts the thorny questi on of whether th is or Ihat
author in volved in the phi losophic is what he calls sophie, or
whether the ir stances must ultimately be subsumed under that
category. The reason seems to be that he wants to cla im Plato, a nd
especially Socrates, as mantic. 48 That is poss ibl e if, among ot her
th ings, one ignores the host of seemi ng ly ironic stateme nts in
Plato's d ialogues, as well as the ir dramat ic components and the
quarre l Plato sets fort h between phil osophy and poetry, since it is
the poets who are the ones most often driven by mantic long ings.
Nibley holds that Plato was not bei ng ironic (and hence paraphrastic, if not esoteric) when he put in to the mouth of Soc rates
(or o ne of the other figures in his philosophic dramas) what appear to be ma ntic long ings, senti ment s, and thoughts.
No doubt much evidence of the tension between sophi c and
mantic can be found in Plato's d ialogues. And given the (arm and
sty le of those d ia logues, it has not been easy to determi ne exactl y
where Plato (or Socrates) comes dow n on various issues. Hence,
Plato's writings have been open to various differcnt and even
compet ing in terpretations, that being one of the ir charms. Not
everyone w ill agree w ith Nibley's assessment of Plato. But little if
anything is lost of his argument, if it turns out that he is wrong
about where exactly Socrates or Plato (or Aristot le) ought to be
placed in his mantic-sop hic classification schema. What counts is
not whether he managed to classify a ll the players correctl y, bUI
whether he managed to identify the broad ou tlines of a strugg le
between two radicall y different and competing claims to wisdom.

Encountering the Alternatives
For a long time, as I have shown, at least since the second
century, there has been a tendency to minimize the poss ibil ity of a
radical d isagreement between the Bible and Greek philosop hy.
There are certa in justi fications for playing dow n the possibi lity of
48 Though Nibley sometimes faul ts Plato.
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such a conflict. First of all, much of what has subsequent ly taken
place in the West involves, in one way or another, attempts to reach
a syn thesis between or harmonize Greek philosophy and the
Bible. This is clearly the case with Christianity,49 but a similar
process can be found in certain Jewi sh and Islamic circles. The
clearest manifestation of an attempted synthesis is to be seen in the
fl owering of what eventually came to be known as Christian theology. Be that as it may, the story of Christianity cannot be told
without dealing with the encounter with and then the appropriation of Greek philosophy, either knowingl y or unknowin gly, by
various zealous and clever churchmen .
But a closer look at the relationship of Greek philosophy and
biblical wisdom seems to indicate that, instead of a harmoni zation ,
what has taken place is more of an attempt to reach or attain a
synthesis. Is th is attempt ultimately doomed to fai lure? Will the
confrontat ion of the two claims to wisdom result in the one find ing a home, merely being more or less accommodated, within the
larger context of the other? Will one be a guest on terms set by the
host? Will both be transformed by attempts to reach a harmonization? Are such attempts at harmonization merely instances of the
weakening or corruption of either or both philosophy and the
Bible?
While in "Paths That St ray" Nibley provides a number of insightful propositions setting forth certain of the atlributes~which
are coupled to the subsequent hislory---of the two traditions, he
does not provide a systematic account of ex.actly what constitutes
what he called the sophic (or philosophic) quest for wisdom. For
this we can turn to the writings of Leo Strauss.

"Nature" and the Philosophic Quest
We must have a closer look at what Nibley calls the sophic (or
what I prefer to call the philosophic) tradition in its original form.
Nib ley comp lai ns about the way in which the sophic attitude looks
to nature (and hence to a closed natural world) for the explanation
of everything. He specifically targets what the philosophers called
49 And it is especia lly true within the Roman Catho lic version of C hristianity, e lements of which are far more intellectually sophisticated than are most
of the manifestations of Protestant faith.
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nature (pl/ys is), claiming that sophics lend to look to it for a full
account of reality (see, for example. pp. 338-39). He is right. Ancient philosophy involved, above all else. the attempt to close the
door to genuine manifestatio ns of prophetic charisms by fa shioning naturalistic ex planati ons intended to account for all of
reality. Nibley correctly emphasizes that the first philosophers
strove to discover the nature (physis) or essence (ousia) standin g
behind the multiplicity of finite things-they were what might be
called physical investigators.
"The first philosophers," according to Leo Strauss, "are
called by Aristotle 'those who discourse o n nature'; he distinguishes them from those 'who discourse on the gods.' The primary theme of philosophy, then, is ' nature.''' 50 But the quest fo r
the plrysis or nature (or essence). or for the form, idea. or substance of a thing is not what we call nature and it is also problematic. Why? Well. for one reason, it turns out that
Nature, however understood, is not known by nature. Nature had to be discovered. The Hebrew Bible.
for example. does not have a word for nature. The
equi vale nt in biblical Hebrew of "nature" is so methi ng
like "way" o r "custom." Prior to the di scovery of
nature [by the " phys ical investigators" who stand at
the beginning of classical Greek philosophyl, men
knew that each thing or kind of thing has its "way" o r
its "c usto m"-its form of "reg ular be hav ior."Sl
Among other things, what this tells us is that philosophy, understood a.1i the inquiry into nature, has a hi story; it is a unique, tem pora lly located, and hence cond itioned inte llectual endeavor and
is not necessarily coextens ive with human thought as suc h. A nd
this hi story of the idea of an essential "nature" of things is it self
significan t.
With the d iscovery of nature, the Greek notion of the" way"
or "c usto m" of a thing was split " into ' natu re' (physis) on the
o ne hand and 'conventio n' or ' law' (nomos) o n the ot he r ."S2
50 Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey. eds .. introduction 10 Hislory of Po·
lilical Philosophy. 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (987).2.
SI Ibid .• 3.
52 Ibid .
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Aristot le could therefore hold that it was nalural for human beings
10 com municate with language,53 but Ihat it was convenli onal for
some to speak Greek and others Egy pti an and so forth . Likewise,
it is natural for human s 10 be political, that is, to li ve in a city o r
ordered communit y (pol i.~), but the spec ific laws (nomoi) govern ing any particular regime are conven tional , art ifi cial. mere
opin ion (doxa). Hence. they differ from time to time and place to
place like all olher human conven ti ons. One might say that it is
nalural for human beings 10 govern themselves with conventi ons,
for wi thout the powerfu l effects of mora l and legal rules. we would
not be genuinely human.
So what is Ihe essence or nature of a thing? Physis identified
"the chardcter of a thing. or of a kind of thing, the way in which a
thing or a kind of thing looks and acts, and the thing, or the kind
of thing, is taken nOl to have been made by gods or men. ,,54 So
we should not be surpri sed to learn that "t he Greek word for nature (phys is) means primarily 'growth' and therefore also that
into which a thin g grows, the term of Ihe growth , the character a
Ih ing has when its growth is completed, when it can do what onl y
the fu ll y grown thing of the kind in Question can do or do
we ll. "55 But it shou ld also be obvious that "thin gs like shoes or
chairs do not 'grow' but are 'made ' : they are not 'by nature' but
'by art."'56 Included among the artificial things that it is natural
for humans to make or craft by skill (i.e., artifacts) are such things
as language and the commun ities in which we live. and hence also
the opinion (doxa), including the laws, upon which communities
necessarily rest.
But some things. and perhaps even the deepest or highest
things. simply are. They do not grow and are not cu lti vated or cultured; out of some of these things everyt hing else comes. Or, put
53 Hence, man is "by nature" both a rational animal (one capable of communicating with words) and a political animal (living within a structured community). BUi each language and each regime is conventional.
54 Strauss. introduction to His/ory of Philosophy, 2. We can, of course,
speak of the purpose or end or function (telos) of a work of art or a technical
thing crafted by man. And this means that an artifact (or thing crafted by human
design or skill) can be said to have a nature in the sense of that which it is intended by its artificer to be or do.
55 Ibid., 3.
56 Ibid.

L

56

FARMS REVIEW QF BOOKS II 11 ( 1999)

another way, some of these th ings, understood as nature or natures, ulti mately determine, dominate. or control all othe r things
and hence are the First Th ings. Those who sought the nature of
things were therefore especially eager to discover the nature of
what they imagined were these hi ghest or First Things . Suc h
things as atoms and the void. fire. air, water, num bers, ideas, a
prime mover, and the bound less or infinite have been included by
different schools of philosophers among the candidates fo r the
First T hings. Other than prov idi ng us with a ge ne ral label for th e
inquiry into First Things. philosophers have never reached anything like a consensus on these matters.
The quest for a knowledge of the nature of the First T hings.
begi nn ing with and hence grounded in the inqui ry into nature, is
commonly known as ontology (on, be ing, and logos. inqu iry).57
T he quest for an onto logy, that is, for an understand ing of bei ngitself and not simply fo r an encounter with some ex ist ing th ing
that j ust happens to be, comme ncing with a know ledge of the
physis of fi nite, ex.isting thi ngs and mounting methodica lly up to
an ultimate ground of these natures, const ituted what was eventuall y called the "fi rst part of ph il osophy." Logos (word. inquiry.
and hence rationa lity),S8 or how one can come to know the natu re
of thi ngs, was known as the "second part of phil osophy." To gether these two inquiries constituted theory (theoria)-t hat is,
speculation about the nature of things. Inev itabl y questions about
the nature of divi ne things, and how or to what ex.ten t their nature
can be known, were included with in the category of theoret ica l
inquiries by Aristotle. 59
It seems that with Socrates what was called praxis (the practica l
or moral) came to be known as the "third part of phil osophy."
T hese practical or moral inquiries in lO how one oughl to behave
and hence into what we easi ly recognize as ethical and political
issues, though int roduced by Socrates. consti tute major themes in
57 Sometimes this inquiry is know n as metaphysics. Aristotle wrote a
book that carried this name because it fo llowed a book entitled Physis. which
was :m examinalion of what was thought to be the naturc of things. Subsequcntly
the term more or less came to identify inquiries into First Things, that is. what is
now rather common ly called "metaphysics."'
58 Ratio (reason) in Latin.
59 See Aristot le. Metaphysics 1026a. 19- 20.
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several of Plato's dialogues and are dealt with in much detail by
Aristotle (especially in his Nicomachean Ethics and Politics). And
the subsequent sc hools of philosophy (Stoic , Epicurean, Academ ic, and so forth) also focused on ethical or moral and hence
political issues.
Socrates is thus said by Plato to have "turned away from th e
study of the di vine or natural things and directed his inquiries e ntirely to the human things, i.e., the just things, the noble th ings,
and the things good for man."60 And why did Socrates turn away
from the inquiry into natural or divine things, and take up, in their
place, questions about virtue, justice, courage, and so forth? " I t
seems that Socrates was induced to turn away from the study of
the di vine or natural thin gs by hi s piety. The gods do not approve
of man's trying to seek out what they do not wish to reveal."61
If this is true, a genu inely pious man will focus on human
th ings and leave those other and perhaps dangerous mailers alone.
Socrates is thus known both for his piety and for asking questions
that begin with "what is . .. ?" These questions still dealt with th e
nature of th ings, but more precisely with human things; Socrates
thus sought to grasp "the nature of the kind of thi ng in question,
that is. the form or the character of the t hin g."62 And he also
sought to relate eac h thing to the whole in which it is situated.
Plato tell s us that Socrates was especially concerned about actual
human society, but even more about the nature of man, since he
assumed that one cannot genuinely understand human things
without seeing how individuals might become truly human . And
the inqu iry into this and related questions began with an exam ination of the opinion found in actual communities, and hence into
moral and legal rules, which were seen by him not as divine or
natura l imperati ves but as human conventions intended to cultivate
the noble and just in man, or at least to control the base, degrading, and dehumanizing. Th is inquiry led directly to a consideration of the question of the status of the rewards and punishments
that seem to support the behavior demanded by moral and legal
rules and hence also led to questions of what became known as
th eology.
60 Strauss. "Introd uclion," 4.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid .. 5.
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The Situation and Function of "Theology" in the Quest for
Wisdom concerning Human Things
The word theology (theo[ogia) was first introduced into philosophic di scourse in Book II of Plato' s Republic, where it describes model s of the "fine tales" that poets, broadly understood.
ought to be required to tell children in a well-ordered city.f)3 Th e
argument goes as follows. Virtue or human excellence (arelc) is
acquired by edu cat ion; it must be learned. Virtue cannot exist o utside a co mmunity , for its hi gher clements are cultivated or c ul tured. But ch ildren (or childlike adu lts, that is, most humans for
most or at least some of the time) cannot unde rsland the real reaso ns for habituall y acting justl y. They must therefore be told stories that link the virtues to stories of proximate and al so ultimate
di vine rewards and puni shments . Nothing short of such " rine
tales" will have the power to persu ade children (and hence also
ch ildlike adult s) to habitually obey the legal and moral rules and
he nce to act justly . And a community short on the necessary virtues (or educated habits) will be filled with factions-will be di sorderly, ungoverned, and ungovernab le. 64
For Plato, at least, it seems that the necessary "fin e tal es"
about divine rewards and punishme nts for obeying or di sobey ing
laws are not, strictl y speaking, true; they are, instead, "nob le lie s."
The problem is that the poets have orten not told the necessary
" fine tales. " In stead, "with one tongue they all c hant that mod·
eration and justice are fair, but hard and ru ll of drudgery, while
intemperance and injust ice are sweet and easy to acqu ire, and
shameful on ly by opinion and law. "65 In doing this the poets
63 See Plato, Republic 379a. 376e-382e. For a nice tra nsl:ltion. see The
Republic of P/a/O, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books. 1968). 54-61.
for the exchange in which Ihe word tlre%gia is introduced inlo the discussion of
"noble lies."
64 And a corollary is that a sou l nOl focused on virtue will also be in volved in what can be seen as an analogue to the civil war or factional squabbles
that amict att actual (and hence disordered) communities.
65 Plato, Republic 363e-364a. That is. they arc m3de shameful by opinion (doMJ) and law (nomos). One writer nOles thaI "there can be no daunt that
Plalo's arguments against the an of poetry are much more like ly to sound stra nge
to the reader of today. who is no longer familiar with the ro le of Ihe poets in
Greek education. It was the practice then 10 justify the whole of one's knowledge
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produced a literature and other artifacts that undercut the cru cial
link betwee n virtue and obedience to moral and legal rules. They
thereby overlooked the ultimate and decisive bond between the
need for just acts and the deeper pleasure or happiness that pre sumably attends genui ne human excell ence or the whole of human virtue; they di smantled the ultimate sanction for law, that is.
they quest ioned di vine rewards and punishments. 66
It is necessary "to superv ise the makers of tales; and if they
make a fine tale, it mu st be approved, but if it' s not, it must be rejec ted ...67 The poets, includ ing even Homer and Hesiod, have
"su rely composed fa lse tales for human beings."68 It is not that
they have necessarily told lies. In fact, it might be beller if they
had. since even the "fine tales" that ough t to be told to children
(or childlike adults) are not always or necessari ly simply true,
" th ough there are true things in the m 100 ." 69 If we are to have
virtuous human beings and also a well-ordered city, we will need
some mode l for the songs to be sung, the stories told , the " em broideries woven" for the habituation in virtue that is necessary in
a just city (polis). And this means that poets " must be compe lled
to make speec hes" that conform to these rational models. 70 In a
weB-orde red pol ity there must be what we would recognize as censorship of the various arts (includ in g music, sculpture, drama. literature. poetry) and hence thereby control of opinion (doxa). It is
exactly at this point in Plato's Republic that the hypothetical
model for the speeches that ought to be made by poets to children
(and childlike aduhs) is given the designation "theology."

. .. by recourse to Homer (just as Christian writers justified their know tedge by
recourse to the Bible). In addition, listening to poetry had often completely
given way to fantastic allegorization and hairsplitting exegesis, and, given the
domin:lnce of the spoken word in the Greek world, a poetic formulation taken out
of context as creed or maxim went from the ear to the soul without the poet's
overall intention defining and limiting its application." Hans·Georg Gadamer,
Dialogue al1d Dialectic: Eight Hermel1eutical Studies 011 Plato, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1980),47.
66 Sec Plato, Republic 3Mb,
67 Ibid., 377b; compare Plato, Laws 652a-674c.
68 Plato, Republic 377d.
69 Ibid., 3773.
70 Ibid., 378d.
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It appears that Plato does not have Socrates (or the Athenian
Stranger in hi s Laws) inquire into the nature of divine thin gs as
such, though much is said about divine things in these and so me
of his other dialogues, but o nly into the question of what ought to
be taught and believed about such matters for the sake of the best
poss ibl e reg ime. "Theology" is thus political. It is not ma ntic. II
is not what the Gods reveal about themselves thro ug h prophets,
though it is located in and expressed by what poets say about suc h
maUers. In Plato's Laws the con tent of theology is what wise mcn
come to understand should be be lieved by children (or childlike
adults. that is, most people) about di vine things. Th e truth of
"theology" is thus seen as a soc ial cement.
If we seek guidance regardi ng the proper contents of " th eo logy," understood as the "fine tal es" that must be told to youths,
or to those unable to control their desires, appetites, or passions
without the threat of divine rewards and punishments (that is, all
those unqualified for the philosophic life, the quest for knowledge
of First Things), then we must turn to Book X of Plato's Laws.7I
It is there that we find the initial effort to set forth rudiments of
what would eventually become the famous proofs for the ex. istence or real ity of God. Here we have. set forth for the first time.
the God of the philosophers.
And it is at this point that Plato has the characters in hi s didactic dramas argue that atheists are the mortal enemies of a wellordered communit y prec isely because th ey sever the crucial link
between the divine and the uhimate sanct ions for e ither obed ie nce
or disobedience to the lawsJ2 It is also where prophets~once
again those Nib ley sees as dri ven by mantic longi ngs o r ex.peclations~are seen as disruptive to the social order. Why? A wellordered community is threatened by individuals who mi ght suddenly claim that the actual laws govern ing a given co mmunity are
in fact an abomination in the sight of God. Proplritai (p rophets)
also ought to be term inated. si nce their presence could also be disrupti ve to the proper order of a well -constituted communi ty.

7 1 Especially PI.:.to. Laws 884a- 89ge.
72 And hence we also have the proposal set forth in Book X of the Laws.
that in a well-constituted regime some .:.theists ought to be put to death. Does
this, perhaps, explain the fate of Socrates?
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So, from the perspective of phi losophy, it is useful and per·
haps even necessary for wise men to set forth arguments that seem
to demonstrate the reality of the divine and also assert a link be·
tween the existing laws of a community and the divine as under·
stood by wise men. And here we have, for what appears to be the
first time, the inactive, static God of the philosophers being set in
place-for essentially political (or ethical) purposes. 73 Why? It
appears, or it is at least possible, that for Plato the "p roofs" for
God, though they may contai n some truths, are actually noble lies.
They appear intended to place powerful controls on the desires of
yout hs and others lacking the habits that constitute the virtues
necessary for a well·ordered soul or community. They are de·
signed for those incapable of a life fully controlled by reason.
For Aristotle the inquiry into divine things (that is, into the
nature of God) seems to have been subsumed under the "first part
of philosophy," within the life driven by the quest for knowledge
of the nature of things and mounting up to the inquiry into First
Things.74 The way was thus paved for God to become another
name for whatever the philosopher considered the First Thing .
And it was argued, begi nning with Plato, that the essential and" b y
nature" most noble or hi ghest thing for man is the use of reason
in the nob le quest for know ledge and wisdom. The highest mani·
festation of suc h a virtue is to be found in one genuinely engaged
in the quest for virtue, beginn ing with questions such as "w hat is
virtue?" It therefore shou ld not come as a surprise that Aristotle
thought that God is a kind of d isembodied philosopher-that
God, when properly understood. is pure thought thinking about
thought. I suppose that this turn s God into something like the ul·
timale ground of rational discourse.
So there is, at least from the perspective of classical philoso·
phy, an inevitable collision between what every actual commu nity
and its poets or prophets happen to teach about divine things, and
what ought to be taught and believed in a well·ordered commu·
nity . There are, therefore, d ifferent types or levels of "theology."
73 And wise men must control the content of theology, since the very idea
of genuinely active Gods revealing new things 10 prophets is potentially threatening 10 the laws and hence 10 the order needed in a well-constituted regime.
74 AI leasl Aristotle'S argument for a "prime mover" can be found in hi s
Physics 6-8, and in his Metaphysics XII .
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The vu lgar or unin structed must hold to the opin ions common to
the community in which they fmd themselves. while ph ilosophers,
those pursuing the know ledge of the nature of things, may come
to somewhat different and even contradictory opinions. Philosophe rs also tended to be tolerant of the recei ved opinions about
divine things found in more or less stable communiti es . The re
were various reasons for Ihis tolerance. One was the threat of pe rsecuti on for hete rodox opi nions.
But there is a deeper reason that philosophers like Plato seem
to have held that a well -ordered regime actually needs opinio ns
that may not necessarily be simply true. Phil osophers, at least in
public. tended to respect th e theo logy of the co mmunity . or what
eve ntually came to be called political (or civic) theo logy. In private, however, they e ngaged in inqui ries that at least pote ntially
called into question the opin ions that they knew grou nded the
moral and legal o rder of their communities.1 5 But whatever thei r
private opinions, their public endeavors cons isted of support for
notions of divine rewards and punishment s, while they also e ngaged in presumabl y noble efforts to refine the "t heology" of
their commun it ies for the sake of these commun ities. 76 And thi s
was often done by subtly redefining divine things in an effort to
bring the popu lar beliefs more in line with what they consi dered
the nature of First Things . In this way they sought to provide a
more noble conception of divine things by e ngaging in rati ona l
inquiri es in to the nature of God .
The so-called "proofs" for God-and in Ihis sense a theology rest ing on an inquiry into the nature of things-is thu s not
always entire ly consistent with the work of poets or even with th e
accepted opinions on suc h matters found within any actual communi ty. Those demonstrat ions of God originall y offered by
Plato 77 were set forth as the best efforts of wise old men who were
e ngaged in a jou rney (or a quest involving an ascent) movin g
sy mbol ically from low to hi gh things, from human things to d i75 On this maller, see especially Ciccro's fa mous dialogue entitled De
dcorum.
76 And also (0 protect themselves from being forced, like Socrale~ (presumably for the boldness of his heresies). to drin k [he hemlock or undergo some
similar sanction.
77 Plato, Laws 1:185d-89 1e, 894e-900d.
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vine. These old gents are thus pictured as busy during their sy mbolic ascent setti ng forth a model and a rational grounding for the
laws necessary for a well-ordered polis, and also in linking divine
rewards and punishments to those laws.

The Appropriation of "Theology" by Christians
Later the variations on these arguments would be identified by
the famous Stoic philosopher Marcus Terentius VarTO (116-27
B.C.) as "natura l theology" (/heologia naturalis)-that is, what
philosophers might presumably demonstrate through unaided
human reason about divine things- which he then contrasted with
the political (or civic) and the poetic theology common to actual
human communities. Yarro's classification of theology (and also
his similar classification of the gods) was later appropriated by
Augustine (A.D. 354- 430)78 and other Christian theologians eager to find a synthesis between the Bible and classical philosophy,
or between what Tertullian and olhers identified as the wisdom of
Jerusalem and the wisdom of Athens. How did efforts to generate
Ihis synthes is come about?
As we have seen, theology (a term from theos or god, and logos or word, and nol found in either ancient or modem scripture)
was first employed by Plato to describe the stories appropriately
told by poets in a well-ordered city.7 9 As such it constitutes one
of the "nob le lies." The word theology was not crafted to describe the mantic (that is, divine special revelations, or the word of
God), but merely human inquiries into the nature of things. Aristotle has theologians offeri ng mythological explanations, while
philosophers look 10 nature for explanations. He also assigned
theology, as he understood it, to the first part of philosophy
(theoria), which looks to nature for an understanding of First
Things.80 In the Christian tradition, Origen (A.D. 185-254) seems
to have been the first to describe the opinions of Christians, rather
than those of the pagans, as theology. With Augustine we see the
elaboration of a classification scheme in which natural theol ogy (what philosophers, probing nature, say about God) is given
78 In Books IV and VI of Augllstine·s famous CiryojGod.
79 See Plato. Republic 379a.
80 See AristOilc. Metaphysics 6.1025.

64

FARMS REV IEW OF BOOKS 11/1 ( 1999)

prio rity over the stories to ld in the community (c ivil or po lit ical
theo logy) and over what poets have made of those stories (poetic
theo logy).81
What was unde rstood as theology wit hi n the ho ri zon of paga n
Greek philosophy, which I have j ust described, was o rigi nally ca utiously introduced into Chri st ianity by O rigen and mo re tho roughly but also cautiously by Augusti ne in his famo us City of
God. Theology thus understood is not biblical.
The fruit of this borrow ing from pagan ph ilosophy can be
seen in the works of the counc ils, in the vocabu lary of the ecumen ical creeds, and especiall y in the theology that took its c ue
from the efforts of the three so-called Cappadocians: Basil of Caesarea (ca. 330- 79), Gregory of Nyssa (ca. 332- 95), and Grego ry
of Nazianzus (ca. 329-89), who struggled to devise for mulas to
explain how the Father, Son, and Ho ly Ghost, though clearly separate beings fro m the perspecti ve o f the New Testament, could still
be understood as one God. This was accomp li shed by invoking
categories borrowed from pagan sources and hence fo re ign to the
Bib le. 82
Among those writing in Greek it became co mmon to refer
to God's "be in g" or "essence" (ousia), which was somet imes
translated as "substance" (Lat in substantia). But in o rder to protect against monarchians (mono + arche, litera lly "one-ru le") a nd
Sabellians (or modalists), who st ressed that there reall y was o nl y
o ne God, Christians began to insist on there being what they called
three persons (personae in Latin, borrowed from the Greek prosopon). Tertullian seems to have used this word to ident ify the
mask worn by an actor in a play, but he also insisted , agai nst the
modalists, that a "pe rson," at least in Ro man law, was a separate,
d istinct entity and he nce capable of owni ng property (substantia).
In th is way he attempted to avoid hav ing Father, Son, and Ho ly
Spirit simp ly di ssolved into one Bein g, which is exact ly what the
moda li sts were doin g.
Augusti ne uses the labe l theology to identify the rece ived
op in ions about the god s found in Rome and also what the poets
have done with those opinions. He does not, as later Ch ri stian wril81 See Augustine. Cit),ojGod tV. VI.
82 See Pelikan. Christianit)' and CIa..iSicai Cllilure. 28-29. 32-33. 84-85.
86-89, 238- 39.
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ers have done, connect theology with the divine revelation or with
the contents of the sc riptures nor does he use the word to identify
knowledge gained by reflections on what is found in the scriptures, that is, on the content of faith. Instead, when Augustine
borrows from Varro-whom he praises for his considerable understanding and deep learning- what he called "natural theology," he treated this as something very much like the science
(scienria) or wisdom (sapienria) available to unaided human reason. Christians eventually came to use the term natural theology
to describe rational, as opposed to mystical, efforts to capture the
divine se lf-understanding-the nature, being, or mind of God that
can presu mably be known either by analogy from the created
world (the so-called teleological and cosmological arguments) or
by reflection on being-itself (the ontological arguments).
But this sort of intellectual endeavor has been much more at
home among Roman Catholics than among Protestants. And it is
customary to find Protestants either uninterested in or actually
opposed to "natural theo logy," or to theology overtly drawn
from a philosophical c ulture. What many Protestants do not seem
to understand is that, whatever their insistence on a so-ca lled dogmatic or " biblical theology" and hence on theology understood
as the word of God, they also have inherited an understand ing of
God that is heavily influenced by the infusion of pagan philosophy into medieval Christian theology, some of which is found in
the creeds, while other elements were passed on to them by
Augustine.
Thi s is the point made repeatedly by Nonnan Geisler and
Ralph MacKenzie in a recent study, though, of course, they put
the best possible face on the facts they set forth. In comparing
traditional Roman Catholicism with contemporary evangelical
religios ity , these two evangelical theologians advance the thesis
that what they label "Augustinianism" was "the major soteriological rramework that informed Western Christianity. Both
Roman Catholics and Protestanls are indebted to the Bi shop of
Hippo {Augustinel.,,83 They claim that " both Catholics and
ort hodox [evangelical?] Protestants have a common creedal and
83 Norman L. Geisler and Ralph E. MacKenzie. Roman Catholics and
EvungeJicu/.s: Agreements wuJ Differences (Grnnd Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books,
1995). 431.
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Augustinian doctrina l background . Both gro ups accept the creeds
and confess ions and cou nc ils of the Chri stian churc h of the first
fi ve centuries. Both claim Augustine as a me nt o r. "84 I certainl y
agree with the opinio ns of Geisler and Mac Kenzie on this matter.
One major theme o f thei r argume nts is that, whether evangelicals
know it or not, they are profoundl y indebted to August ine fo r
much of thei r theology.
That P rotestanti sm in its various man ifestatio ns is g rou nded in
medieval theo logical speculations turns out to be true desp ite the
co mmon assu mption by the morc biblicall y orien ted factions of
recent Protestantism (that is, the most recent varieties of evangeli cal, as well as fund amentalist and Pentecostal, re li gios ity) that the ir
dogmas are drawn only from the Bible. What they do not see is
that their way of readi ng the Bible is heavily innue nced by later
philosoph icall y grounded theology and is a lso depe ndent on the
creeds, which bo rrow muc h o f the ir crucial termin ology f ro m
pagan phil osophy. Proof of this is found in the obvious fact that
portions of evangelical and fundame ntalist dog matic theo logy rest
on not ions about d ivine things that are set forth in language b orrowed from a philosophical culture. For example, noti ons of th e
Trinity o r even sal vation "by grace a lone" were ori gi nall y not
biblical at all . They were, instead , hammered out by people like
Augustine, who were working at least in part within the categories
alread y borrowed fro m vari ous schools of phil osophy.

" A Nonspecuiative Religion"
Even when the business of theology is seen as essent ially descripti ve or apo logetic, it is not e ntire ly at ho me amo ng Latter-day
Saints, who have not manifested much sympath y fo r the noti o n
that d ivine things can be discovered with the unaided resou rces of
the human mi nd. 85 From the perspective of the restored gospel,
what can be known about di vi ne th ings has been, must be, and still
can be revealed by God to seers and prophets. T hough the beliefs
of Latter-day Saints are rationally structured (that is, more o r less
cohere nt and orde red), the content of the faith is not the mere
84

Ibid .. 17.

85 Latter-day Saints have occasionally referenced arguments for the rea lity
of God, but they draw nothing Significant from them for fa ith.
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fruit of philosophical specul at ion about the nature of First Things,
nor has it been deduced from premises or in some way deri ved
from philosophical or scienti fic inquiries into the nature of th ings.
Instead, the beliefs of the Saints are deri ved fro m or are grounded
in di vine special revelations or from refl ection on such revelations.
Hence, port ions of the faith of the Sai nts have been at times set
fort h in what are considered authoritative statements.
The test of faith for the Saints is thus not the work of a counci l
and is not set forth in a traditional confess ion, nor is it linked
to one or more of the ecumenical creeds. Faith should be- must
be- groun ded on a witness that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ,
and it should refl ect genuine mantic longings. The presence of the
Book of Mormon and other sacred texts, when coupled with the
belief in continuing contact between God and his prophets, allows
the beliefs of the Saints to be identifi ed and also allows a space for
corollaries to these basic beliefs to fi t changi ng circumstances, as
God sees fit to reveal his mind and will to hi s prophets. The Saints
may draw on their scriptures and the words of their prophets to
meet thcir sp iritual needs, and also on chari sms broadly available
within their own prophet ic community. Thi s leaves little need o r
even much room for a formal theology, and even less room fo r
systematic treat ises inte nded to fi x, order, and settle the understanding of the be lievers. It does, though, allow an appropriate,
subordinate role for reason, broadly understood, as a powerful
and necessary tool fo r attainin g co herence and for understanding
and also work ing out the mean ing and implications fo und in the
reve lations.
It is theology, understood as the altempt to discover the nature
of divine things by unaided human reason, that the Saints see as
challenging, rad ically altering, or competing with the original understanding of biblical messages. From a Latter-day Saint perspecti ve, atte mpts to provide systematic accounts of divine th ings
on the bas is of categories drawn from philosophy are seen as indications of apostasy, signs of which are detected when categories
and explanat ions fo reign to the scriptures are used to replace (or
to corrupt) the revealed content of fa ith. T he Saints look with suspicion on speculation about divine things and hence have not
been particul arl y attracted to proofs about the nature or the reality
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of God- Iha! is, to what has been known as natu ral theology si nce
Augustine borrowed thai label fro m Varro.
Not havi ng what has traditionally been understood as theol-

ogy, Latter-day Saint s instead have sacred (eds that describe
thcophanies and special revelations and contain inspired teachings. T hese are accompanied by several accounts of God's establis hing his covenant people, usuall y coupled with accounts of a

d ialectic of obedience and di sobed ience that fo llowed such events.
S uch accounts may be sa id to con tai n " theo logy," but not in th e
sense that it is assumed to be a body of know ledge accessible to
hu man ingenuity rather than the word o r will of God as revealed
to and t hrough prophets.
The Book of Mormon. along with the accoun t of its co min g
fo rth , anchors the faith of Latter-day Sai nts. It is, however, not
theological specu lation. Instead, it is a lo ng and tragic histo ry,
providing those who now possess it with prophetic warnings about
deviations from their own covenants with God. In the Book of
Mormon (and other sacred texts) the doctrine o f Jesus C hrist provides the rock (or foundati on) for all other beliefs, practices, an d
understand ings. W hat the Book of Mormon ca ll s "t he doctrine of
Jesus C hri st" is a si ngul ar teaching, having several point s, including fa ith in Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah o r C hrist. repe ntance,
bapti sm, and the g ift of the Holy G hosl. 86 Those who observe
these points of doctrine. wh ich are all set withi n a cosmic plan of
rede mpt ion (see, for example, A lma 12:25; 34:9), and who "e n dure to the end " as they strive 10 keep the commandments will be
saved in the kingdom of God by the me rits and mercy of the Ho ly
O ne of Israel (see 2 Nephi 25:29; 3 1:20; 3 Nephi 15:9). T his
understandi ng of the gospel was known to the orig ina l prophets of
the Lehi colony (see, for example, 1 Nephi 15: 14) and was later
taught by Jesus on his visit to his fa ithful followers (see 3 Neph i
11:30-40; 27: 1-22). As both g round and substance of the fa ith
of the Saints. these are simply real ities and not matters of conjectu re. S7 It is a mistake to see the bas ic points of doctri ne or what is
86 See Noel B. Reynolds. 'The True Points o r My Doctrine," lVI/mal of
Book
Marman Studies 512 (1996): 26-56.
8
See Louis Midgley. "Prophetic Messages or Dogmatic Theology?"
Rel'iew oj B(J(}ks on Ihe lJouk of Mormon t ( 1989): 92- 113. For an investiga'
tion from a Laucr-day Saint perspective or the differences between the prophetic
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bui lt upon them as theological speculation, just as it is inaccurate
to sec them as myths or to see Joseph Smith as a mystic. 88
The con tent of the fa ith of Lauer-day Saints is thus rooted in
events they fir mly believe actuall y happened. Jesus was the literal
Son of God, was born in Pa lestine, was crucified, rose the third
day, and appeared to his di sciples in both the Old and the New
Worlds. Jesus Chri st appeared to Joseph Smith and sent his messengers to restore the fulness of his gospel and provide add iti onal
sacred texts. Hence, it is in historical work, espec ially that which
records the cruc ial found ing revelat ions, that both the exp lication
and also the defense of the fa ith takes place. The Saints can
sca rcely be said to have much in the way of a dogmatic theology,
though they sometimes informall y borrow the tendency that was
estab lished by Roman Catholic writers as earl y as the eleventh
cen tury 10 designate the who le of Chri sti an dogma by the label
theology.
Co ming as they did from mostly Protestant sectarian bac kgrounds. the earl y Saints were fond of the word theology, and it
tu rns up here and there among their writings. And they seemed to
desire someth ing like an authoritative compendium of their beliefs. An examp le of the literature thi s des ire seems to have ge nerated is provided by Parley P. Pratt 's Key to the Science of Theology, once a popu lar little book.89 Such books seem to have filled
a need for an orderl y ex plicat ion of what was believed to have
been revealed Ihrough Joseph Smith, but they do not a pproac h
what is commonl y understood as theo logy in Christian circles and
have never enjoyed anythi ng approaching the popularity of the
sc ri ptures as authoritative texts in the life of the Saints. And some
Saints also seem to have felt a need fo r someth ing approachin g a
and theo logica[ (or philosophical) approaches to the possibil ity and content of
faith, see the essays by Nibley in The World and the Prophets.
88 See Nib[ey, "Prophets and Mystics," in The World and fhe Prophet:>.

98-[07.
89 Parley P. Pratt's Key fO fire Science of Theology: A Voice of Warn in g.
9th cd. (Salt Lake City: Dcseret Book, 1965) was initia ll y published in 1855.
One historian has complained because he assumed that I am interested in defending the contents of this book. See Sterling M. McMurri n. 'Toward Intellectual
Anarchy," Dialogue 26/2 (1993): 210-tl. Nothing could be furt her from the
truth. [ am no more interested in promOling Prall 's little book than I am in promoting any of MeMurrin's own theological speculations.
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creed or an orderly and authoritative setting fo rth of their beliefs.
What they managed to produce were initially called " th eo log ical
lectures," which were later known as Lectures on Faith. 90 Formal
theological treatises found in Protestant sectarian circles suc h as
those fashioned by Charles G. Finney (1792- 1875) or Alexander
Campbell ( 1788- 1866) may have provided models for these
materials. 91 Even thou gh the Lectures on Faith have been widely
available92 and attempts to breathe life into them have nOI entirely
disappeared,93 these efforts to sel forth LDS beliefs have had little
influence on the life of the Saints.
The desire for definitive answers to a host of seemingly interesting or perhaps even vex ing questions has been satis fi ed recently
by books written by Elder Bruce R. McConkie .94 His writings
have obviously not been influenced by a philosophical culture, as
is much of Christian theo logy, and hence represent more nearly
an instance of dogmatic rather than speCU lati ve, formal. or systematic theology. Such compendia have no official stand ing among
Latter-day Saints and offer onl y the opinions of their authors.95
The des ire to have "Mormon" Icachings set forth in a seemingly philosophically sophisticated manner has been gratified by
Sterling McMurrin. who attempted to show how traditional phi 90 See Noel B. Reynolds. 'The Authorship Debate concerning tbe Leclllres
on Faith: Exhumation and Reburial." in The Disciple as Witness: Essa)'s on
lAtter-do)' Sail1l History and Doctrine in Honor of Richard Uoyd Anderson. ed.
Stephen D. Ricks. Donald W. Parry, and Andrew H. Hedges (forthcoming 1999).
91 See ibid.
92 They were the original "'doctrinal" portion of the Doctrine and
Covenants. The sections eont:lining reve lations to Joseph Smith :lnd cerlain
other materi:lls. which are currently known as the Doctrine and Covenants, were
originally known as the Book of Covenants and Commandments or simply as
the Book of Commandments.
93 See, for example. the new version of the Lectures on Faith published by
Larry E. Dahl and Charles D. Tate Jr., eds., The Lectures on Faith in Historical
Perspective (Provo. Utah: BYU Re ligious Studies Center, 1990).
94 S~ especially Bruce R. McConkie' s once-popular compendium of
opinions on various topics cntitled Mormon Doc/rine. 2nd ed. (Salt Lake City:
Bookcraft. 1966). The first edition of this book became notorious because some
of what it contained had to be deleted or altercd in the subsequent redaction.
95 Books like Mormon Doctrine have recently been more or less replaced
by the muc h less dogmatic Encyclopedia 0/ Mormonism as a primary source for
information on the bel iefs. practices. and history of Laller·day Saints.
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losophy and Chrislian Iheology might be accommodated to what
he believed was the ontology (or metaphysics) somehow necessari ly inherent in LOS teachings, But his obvious failure to take
inlo account divine special revelations seriously undermined his
project, as did his misunderstanding of many LOS bel iefs, He discounted the possibility of divine revelation and looked instead for
signs of naturalism and humanism in the beliefs of the Saints,
McMurrin thought that what he called "Mormon theo logy"
manifests a "h umanistic lemper." He also liked to refer to the
"naturalist ic facet of Mormon though t" and the "naturalistic
quali ty of Mormon phi losophy."96 What McMurrin rather gratuitously attributed to the Saints were some of hi s own naturalistic
biases.
McMurrin, among other things, asserted without argument that
the "Mormon religion" manifests "a naturalistic and humanistic
qualit y uncommon in theistic religion."97 His use of philosophical, theological, and ideological terminology, though elegant,
smacks of what one might find in the glossary of an introductory
textbook. Hence, hi s characterization of what he calls "Mo rm o n
theo logy" and "Mormon religion" simply doesn't makes sense,
since he employed terms like naturalism and humanism in their
most ordinary meaning. "It is," he opined, "perhaps not ent irely
inaccurate to describe Mormonism as a kind of naturalistic,
humanistic theism."98 In making such assert ions, he never once
gave even a hint that he was e ngaged in shrewd terminological
legerdema in by means of which he had radicall y redefined hi s
termino logy. Instead, he read into the faith of the Saints some of
the slogans that defined his own ideology.99 His views remain
incomprehensible to most Latter-day Saints, though at times they
seem to draw attenti on from those not familiar with Mormon
96 Sterling M. McMurrin, foreword to The Theological Foundations oj th e
Mormon Religion (Satt Lake City: University of Utah Press. 1965), 2-3. He did
nOi sense that the adjective contradicts the noun when he referred to "Mormon
philosophy"- and for exactly the same reason that Leo Strauss argued that there

can be no such thing as a "Jewish phi losophy," though the re can be cultural Jews
who arc also philosophers.
97 Ibid., I.
98 Ibid., 3.
99 For a detailed examination of McMurrin's rathe r banal "naturalistic
humanism," see Midgley, "A Mormon Neo-Orthodoxy," 289-305, 317-30.
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things. They thereby divert attention to malters of specu lative
theology and to the ideological labeling that oflen lakes the place
of genuine ph ilosophy-and hence away from historical matters
and the crucial prophetic claims upon which the faith rests,lOO

Certain elements of McMurri n's stance, not always full y understood, have been appropriated by a few cu ltural Mormon critics eager to show Ihat there has been a radical "reconst ruction of
Mormon doctri ne" as it has allegedly shift ed from a pessimistic
orthodoxy to a presu mably more fas hionab ly opti mist ic li beral ism
and then back toward an even more dreadful . pessimistic neoort hodoxy. Offe nded by what they perceive as the pessimistic

account of man fo und in LDS sc riptu re, since the sacred texts
obv ious ly take sin and the need fo r a redemption seriously, a few
"li beral" critics have striven to fi nd grounds fo r denying the necessity of an atoning sacrifice by JeSllS of Nazaret h. IO! The li terature containing such arguments is not we ll-known amo ng
Latter-day Saints generally and has had virtually no impact on th e
life of believers. Instead, the infl uential scholarl y works a mong
Latter-day Saints tc nd to be either historical or eKegetical, th ough
these too have no offic ial stand ing. But these attempts to li nk
Mormon beliefs to the vocabulary of Protestant liberal ism are
marginal even within the Latter-day Saint inte ll ectual com munity.

Is an Accommodation Possible between J erusalem a nd
Athens?
Accord ing to Strauss, so me hold that what he considered th e
two cruc ial "rools of the Western world," which he sy mbolized
100 McMurdn's attention to the actual faith of Latter-day Saints was marginal and he nce flawed. He actually boasted that he had never read the entire
Book of Mormon. See Sterling M. McMurrin and L. Jackson Newell, Matlers of
ConseienCl!: ConverslIIions wilh Sterling M. McMurr;n 011 Philosophy. EdUCtllion, and Religion (Salt Lake City: Signature Books. 1996), 114.
101 For the Single most outlandish example of such an attempt to argue that
"traditional Mormonism," understood throug h the lens provided by Sterling
McMunin. had no need for an atonement or redemption from sin by Jesus Chris\.
since it advanced a "liberal" view of man, see O. Kendall White Jr., Mom/on
Nco-Orthodoxy: A Crisis Theology (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1987).
For a detailed criticism of White' s argument and an account of his dependence on
his own understanding of MeMurrin's religious sympathies and ideology, see
Midgley, "A Mormon Nco-Orthodoxy," 285-87, 289-316, 321-34.
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by Je rusalem and Athens, are incompatible. They contend that a
harmonization of the Bible and Greek philosophy is ultimalely
simp ly impossible, precisely because
eac h of these two roots of the Western world sets forth
one thing as the one thing needful . and the one thin g
needful proclaimed by the Bible is incompatible, as it is
understood by the Bible. with the one thing needful
proclaimed by Greek philosophy. as it is understood by
Greek philosophy. 102
Strauss argued that "the one thing needful according to
Greek philosophy," from within the hori zon of that cu ltural per~
spective, "is the life of autonomous understandin g,"103 or the
quest for a knowledge of First Things accessible by reason alone.
Philosophy thus understood was not a set of dogmas, but a way of
life. On the other hand, from the perspective of the Bible, the one
thing needful is "the li fe of obed ient love."104 Hence, the ten~
sian between what is symbolized by Jeru sa lem and Athens turns
out to be a radical quarrel between two contrast ing and competi ng
ways of life.
Strauss argued that this apparent "radical disagreement" be~
tween the Bible and Greek philosophy
today is frequently played down, and this playing down
has a certain superfi cial justification, for the whole history of the West presents itself at first glance as an attempt to harmonize. or to sy nthesize. the Bible and
Greek philosophy. 105

102 The language is from Leo Strauss, "Progress or Return?" whieh can be
fou nd in both The Rebil'"/h of Classical Pofilicai Ralionafism: An !nlroduclion to
Ille Though/ of Leo Str-auss: EsStlYS and Lec/UI'"es by Leo Stmuss. ed. Thomas L.
Pangle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989),246; and lewish Philosophy and the Cr-isis of Modernity, 104. Subsequent citations of Strauss, "Progress
or Rcturn?"' will list the page number from Rebirth lirst and that of Jewish Phi·
10.~o{Jhy second.
103 Strauss. "Progress or Return'?"' 246: 104.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., 245; [04.
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Strauss also argued that all efforts to reach a synt hesis or harmonization of the Bible and Greek philosophy are necessaril y
"doomed to failure . ... [Fori a closer siudy shows thai what happened and has been happening in the West for many centuries is
not a harmonization but an attempt at harmonizati on."I06 At this
point in his study. we see Strauss offering an argument thai sup-

ports the generallhesis advanced by Nibley for distinguishing between sophie and mantic traditions.
Even if we admit that in the final analysis it is impossible to

harmonize the Bible and Greek philosophy, one need not necessarily argue that it is impossible to find a way of accommodating
either the Bible to philosophy or philosophy to the Bible. Perhaps
a place within the one, a lodgi ng or home-an accommodation in
that sense--can be found for the other, even if no real synthesis or
harmonization is possible. Accommodations between philosophy
and the Bible might be possible, even when a harmonization is not,
precisely because, according to Strauss, "Greek philosophy can
lise obedient love in a subservient function, and the Bible can lise
philosophy as a handmaid ; but what is so used in each case rebels
against such use, and therefore the connict is really a radical
one. "t07 In other words, reason may and even must be placed in
the service of divine spec ial revelations. In that case, reason would
no longer stand alone or be strictly unaided. Instead, reason would
then be aided or directed by faith, and hence controlled by its
presuppos itions. And faith, from the biblical perspective, is not
dependent on unaided human reason but on something transcendent-the mighty acts of God in human affairs. That much at least
ca n be seen, if not in the Apostle Paul, at least in Tertullian . who
clearly drew on the forms and some of the content of pagan
culture to support the faith as he understood it .
But is there still not a tension between the two even when the
one has been made subordinate or subservient to the other? Does
not every attempt at finding an accommodation between philosophy and the Bible open the possibility of the underground resis106 Ibid.
107 Ibid. 246; 104. One wonders why Strauss describes such an attempt at a
subordination of the one clement to the other as a synthesis (or harmonization).
rather than as an accommodation in which a place is found within the one or the
other accordi ng to either explicit or implicit rules or subordination.
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lance and rebellion of the one against the claims of the other?
Would not an accommodati on open the poss ibilit y of subtle transformations in one or both of the parties? If we grant that there is a
real or at least a potential tension between the claims of Greek
philosophy and the Bible and if (he two ways of life are ultimately
incompatible when radicalized, then is an attempt at an accommodation either necessary or des irable?
Put another way: are there areas of agreement between the
Bible and Greek philosophy that make possible (or even necessary) some effort at reaching a kind of accommodation between
the two, or that encou rage efforts at accom modation from within
the horizon of either of the two claims to wisdom? What exactly
might be an area of agreement between Greek philosophy and the
Bible, other than their opposition to certain elements of what is
now com monl y called modernity?108 This seemed to Strauss (and
also to Ni blcy) to be a rather fruitful avenue to ex plore.

The Third Part of Philosophy and Biblical Morality
It may not be entirely misleading to say that the Bible and
Greek philosophy agree on morality on many, if not all practical
matters (if not on theoretical ones). But this statement is vague.
More spec ifically. they appear to agree on several matters, including the importance of morality and even concerning some of
the formal "content of morality, and regarding its ultimate insu fficiency."I09 But are suc h areas of agreement sufficie nt to allow
either Greek philosophy or the Bible to subordinate the one to the
other? They seem, for instance, to differ concerning what "s upplements or comp letes moralit y."IIO In order to begin to answer
that question, we must take notice of the di sagreements between
the two that have made Strauss and Nibley, each coming from a
different perspective, see them in radical disharmony, whatever the
obv ious areas of agreement.
Though both Greek philosophy and the Bible appear implicitl y to reject the leading assumptions behind the understanding of
div ine things co mmon to various stands of modernity, they also

tbid. 246: 105.
Ibid.
110 Ibid.
108
109
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disagree on at least the following: ( I) the place of theoretical (or
spec ulative) matters and (2) practical (or moral) matters, speci fi cally concerning the basis or grounds of morality .
Some, of course, may wish to claim that Greek philosophy and
the Bible disagree entirely o n morality, I I I Whatever else might be
said about such a stance, it is certai nly an exaggeration. Moving
further fro m the surface, some may wish to assert that there is a
radical opposi tio n between biblica l and philosophic morality because they find passages here and there that seem to manifest
plain differences. They may find evidence for the radical op position of biblical morality to that found in Greek philosophy because of what they see as advocacy or permissiveness concern in g
homosexuality or pederasty a mong the Greeks. But some statements in Plato's dialogues seem to support the Mosaic teac hin g
on those matters. I 12 And it appears to have been " as obvious to
Aristotle as it was to Moses that murder. theft. adultery, etc., are
unqualifiedly bad ." 113 And both seem to agree, according to
Stmuss. that the framework of morality is the famil y, since both
see the family as the cell of society. 1 14
The Bible and Greek philosophy can be seen as agreeing in
assigning a very hi gh place to what might be called justice, rather
than 10 courage, At least, both lurn away somewhat from cou rage
toward justice as the higher or controlling virtue or moral req uirement. And bOlh seem to mean by justice something occas ioned b y
obed ience to law,115 They both see law as consisti ng of
rules-both moral and civi l, both re ligious and sec ular- to invoke
the modern terminology on such matters. Both see that, for the
community 10 prosper, full obedi ence to the law is required.
Strauss points out that in the language of the O ld Testament it is
the Torah that provides the gu idance for the whole of life, for it is
the " tree of life for those who cling to it to the m that lay hold
upon her" (Proverbs 3: 18. as c ited by Strauss), whi le in Plato we
fi nd lan guage indicati ng that "t he law effects the blessedness o f

III
I 12
113
114

Ibid.
In this regard. Strauss cites Plato's lAws 835e, at
Strauss, " Progress or Return'''' 247: 105.

Ibid.
11 5 See ibid. 247; 106.

ibid .. 246-47: 105.
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those who obey it ."1 [6 Law is also seen as comprehensive both
for the Greek philoso phers and in the Bible. Only within a community regulated by law is it possible to be human, according to
Aristotle. Similarl y. fo r the Jew. what Moses delivered from
God-the Torah-is li ght and life. and for the Christian. the one
who descended from the Father as the Christ is the new Moses. and
hence the new lawgiver. Put another way, the gospel or doctrine of
Jesus Chri st is the way, truth. li ght, and life.
When we look deeper into either the content or the ground of
morality, we begi n to see differences-some of which are radical-belween Greek phil osophy and the Bible. Some language in
Plato's Laws (Book X) about di vine retributi on reminds one of
si milar language in the Bible. where it is clear that disobedience to
divine commandments provokes divine retribution . For the Bible,
the rul e of law is at the same time the rule of God, since it is commanded by God. So it appears. at least on the surface, that the
Bible and Greek philosophy agree o n certain practical (or moral)
matters, specifi cally on the place each assigns to noti ons of justice
and the connecti on between just ice and obed ience to laws, and
even in part on the character of law. They even agree on the importance of belief in divine re tribution , if not e ntirely on the fact
of divine retribution. They also seem to agree. to some extent at
least, concerning the problem posed by the misery of the just and
the prospering of the wicked. Plato. it will be recalled, me ntion s in
the second book of the Republic the problem of the just man who
suffers the fate of the unjust, and the unjust man who seems to
prosper. S uch observations remind one of certain biblical language (for ex.ample. the book of Job or Isaiah 53:7).117 And the
Republic ends with what seems like a restoration of prosperity to
the just, as the book of Job ends with a restoration of what he had
temporaril y lost. 11 8
If we assume that justice, from the perspective of Greek
philosophy, has something to do with obedience to laws that are
116 Plato.lAw$ 718b. See Strauss, "Progress or Return?" 247; 106.
117 Compure Strauss, "Progress or Return?" 248; 106.
11 8 Incidentally, this problem was of such proportions that it led Immanuel
Kant to argue for immortality. freedom. and God (and also for progress in human
history) as necessary postulates of the practical reason. even though he held that
pure reason offered no grounds to support such notions.
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believed to be divine commands or to have been derived from
divine law, we find what appears to be a common g round between
the Bible and Greek philosophy. But this common ground, upon
closer inspection, seems problematic. Each seems to solve the
problem of the statu s of what is commonly believed to be divine
law in a different way.
I have mentioned the place of justice in the Bible and Greek
philosophy. If we are interested in gett ing clear on the root of the
difference between the two truth claims. this may be a good place
to focus attention. If we assume (hat Aristotle's Ethics is " th e
most perfect, or certainly the most accessible, presentation of philosophic eth ics," then we will immediately notice thaI Aris!o!le no!
only insists on justice and obedience to law, but that he also has a
large place for noble pride or magnanimily.119 It appears that, for
Aristotle, in some crucial ways juslice and magnanimity comprise
all olher virtues. Juslice "comprises all other virtues" because it
re lales to aClions between human beings and thus forms Ihe summit of civic virtue. 120 But then magnanimity or pride comprises
the inte llectual virtues because Aristotle seems to believe that it is
proper for a genuinely wise man to claim great honors because he
justly deserves those honors. Such a notion is totally alien to the
Bible. 121 Why? From the perspective of the Bible, obedience to
God's will involves lowering oneself in fear and trembling in an
act of humility, without which obedience to the law is of no avail.
Finally, the biblical insistence on humility, coupled to an intense
Opposilion to pride or arrogance, "excludes magnanimity In Ihe
Greek sense."122
Language in the Bible seems to insist on man's duties to th e
poor, a point Nibley is noted for emphasizing, 123 which seems to
be a rejection of Ihe Greek idea of a gentle man, even though it
is true that philosophers were not vu lgar worshipers of wealth.
Socrates is pictured as living in something approaching poverty,
and Aristotle's Ethicl' contains some interestin g things about
119 See Strauss. "Progress or Return'!" 248; 107,
120 See ibid.
121 See ibid. 248--49; 107.
122 Ibid., 249: 107.
123 Sec, for example. Hugh W. Nibley, Approaching Zioll (Salt Lake Ci t y:
Dcscret Book and FARMS. 1989),
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greed. Strauss notes that Socrates is said to have wondered why we
can say th at a horse is good without having money, but a man
cannot be called good without wealth. 124 On the other hand, Plato
suggests that health. beauty, and wealth form the foundation for
human if not divine goods. 125
According to Strauss, "the Bible . .. uses poor and pi ous o r
just as synonymous lerms." 126 And those who do not care for the
poor are warned that they will lift up their eyes from hell . Hence,
"compared with the Bible, Greek ph ilosophy is heartless in this as
well a~ in other respects."127 Why? Strauss argued that the reason
is that "magnanimity presupposes a man 's conviction of his own
worth. II presupposes that man is capable of being virtuous, thanks
to his own effo rt s." 128 Such noble pride was thought to be de ·
rived from the recognition of one's own superiority in reason and
hence in human wisdom . But the Bible will have nothing of that,
for merit is always made dependent on divine mercy.
Shame, from the perspective of Greek philosophy, appears to
be appropriate only to youth s who have not genu ine ly attained
virtue or who lack a genu ine love of noble things, but not for o ld
men who have attained ethical maturity. A consciousness of human fa ilings is inappropriate in those who have been habituated to
avoid wrong in the first place. But, of course, Greek philosophers
differed over whether any human being can ever really become
fu ll y virtuous or fully wise. If some deny the possibi lity (for
example. Plato in his account of Socrates), they replace the self·
satisfacti on or self-adm iration- the magnanimity or pride-of the
virtuous man with the subtle self-congratulation of the one moving toward virtue or deeply concerned with the whole of virtue,
which is seen as itself the hi ghest possible virtue. 129
The Bibl e and Greek philosophy Ihu s also seem to differ over
the question of gui lt . Guilt seems to be the guiding theme of
tragedy. And Plato seems to expel tragedy from the best city. The
philosopher, the best of men, is a comic and not a tragic figure.
124 See Strauss. "Progress or Return?" 249; \07.
125 See Plato, Laws 66la-662c.
126 Strauss, "Progress or Return?" 249; 107.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 See ibid .. 249-50; 107.
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Tragedy is thu s replaced by c horu ses praising the virtues and
hence those genuinely virtuous. The reason for thi s is that tragedy
is for the multitude and its purpose is to purge both pity and fear
from the c ity,I30
But fear and pity both seem to be passions associated with
guilt. If I genuinely feel guilly. I may perhaps have some pity for
those I have harmed as I failed to obey the laws. And then I ma y
also even begin to fear divine retribution. God, king, and judge
are thus objects of fear. God, the father of all, makes men brothers
and thus hallows pity. But Greek philosophy seems to want to
avoid such a thi ng, viewing it as excessively and even unnecessari ly morbid. Greek philosophy does not seem especially interested in the ruthless examination of intentions. That sort of thing
is stressed, on the other hand, in the biblical demand for purity of
heart. "Know thyself' means, for the philosopher, to know one's
nature, what it means to be human , to know one's place in the
larger pattern of nature, to examine one's prejudices-no! to
searc h one's heart and come away guilty and hence humiliated
and with a c ru shed or broken heart . All of that is biblical language
and quite unlike what is found in Greek philosophy. Suc h a stance
as that held by Greek philosophy can be maintained only if one
assumes that God is not really concerned with man's goodness or
if man's goodness is assumed to be e ntirely man's own affair.I]1
What all this means is that "the Bible and Greek philosophy
agree ... as to the importance of morality or justice" and the resu lting order they gene rate. They even concur, to an extent, on the
formal content of morality, on the place of law in ordering the
commun it y and individual sou ls, "and as to the insufficiency of
morality."132 "Bu t they disagree as to what completes mo ra lit y,"133 and a lso on the grounds of morality.
For Greek philosophy it is understanding or contemp lation
-rationality or the fruit of reason-that completes morality.
Stmuss conceded that this obviously tcnds "to weaken the majesty
of the moral demands, whereas humility, a sense of guilt, rcpentance, and faith in divine mercy, whic h complete morality ac130 See ibid .. 250; 108.
131 Sec ibid.
132 Ibid.

13] Ibid.
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cord in g to the Bible, necessaril y strengthen the majesty of the
moral demands."134 What this means is that, according to Strauss,
the life of philosophy, from the perspective of the Greeks, " is essenti ally a transsocial or asocial possibility, whereas obedience a nd
fa ith are essentially related to the communi ty of the faithful."135
Biblically, by contrast. there can be no genuine obedience a nd
faith without a community gu ided by divine law and living in the
hope of divine mercy.136
Finally, Plato can be read as ho ldi ng that "evil will never cease
on earth , whereas according to the Bib le the e nd of days will brin g
perfect redemptio n."137 The force of the moral demand is thus
weakened in philosophy because it is not backed up with divine
promises. This is o ne reason why hope is e nshrined as a Christian
virtue by Paul and others and is associated with faith and love.
These three stand outside the phil osophic catalogue of the virtues.
Accordi ng to Strau ss, "t he philosopher li ves in a state above fear
and trembling as well as above hope."138 The ultimate goal of a
li fe lived w ith an understand ing of the nature of things is tranqu il ity and apathy. But nothing like that is possible from the perspect ive of the Hible.
Likewise the philosopher finds the beginning of wisdom in
wonder-in a sense of wonder spec ifically concern ing the nature
of the First Things. On the other hand, "Bib lical man lives in fe ar
and trembl ing as well as in hope" grounded on the promises of a
merciful and j ust God. Philosophers thus seem to have a sense of
seren ity. Notice how Xenophon (in On Tyranny) tries playfully to
conv ince a tyrant who had com mitted many "murde rs and other
crimes that he would have derived greater pleasure if he had been
more reasonable" and moderate. 139 Strauss contrasts this story

134 Ibid.
135 Ibid .. 250-5 I: 109.
136 As Strauss notes, Yehuda Halevi, expressing the verdict of medieval ludaism. assened that "the wisdom of Ihe Greeks has most beautifu l blossoms, but
no fruits." For Halevi. the term fruits refers 10 actions aocl deeds, and not mere
words. See ibid. 251; 109.
137 Ibid .. 251: 109.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid., 25 1; 109-10.
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with the account of Nathan's rebu ke of King David "for having
committed one act of murder and one act of adultery 0"140
Now it is true that there is much talk of divine things in Greek
philosophy. And it is sometimes said that the gods can do any~
thing. But why? Because they are thought to know the nature of
things? What this implies is that they are subordinate to somethin g
exterior or that they are somehow models of the philosophic life
cast in mythological form-and that somethi ng exterior is a lso approachable by man through his rcason. Hence the philosopher is a
kind of divine man or one worthy of being called a god. In Greek
thought we seem to find in one form or another an impersonal or
natural necess ity higher than any personal being. I must apologize
for such language, for it obviously caters to the current sense of
what constitutes a person, which is somewhat confu sed if not mi s·
leading. In the Bible the one who rules in the heavens is what we
would now call a "pe rson." Why is this so? Part of the reason is
that one of the things that di stingu ishes Greek philosophy from
the Bible is that ancient Greek philosophy is possible precisely
because of the discovery or invention of the idea of nature, an
idea for which there is no Hebrew equ ivalent. Instead, there is the
not ion of the way (derek" in Hebrew).141 Philosophy is thus
rooted in the quest for knowledge of First Things as that can be
found by investigating (with unaided human reason) what the
Greeks and those who follow in their foot steps knew as nature, or
as the natures of things. From the biblical perspective there is only
the way or custom of a people-the statutes and the law which is
binding o n them because of the covenant that God has made with
them. That covenant proffers to them both blessings for thei r
faithfulness and cursings when they failer. Accordingly, they live
with an awareness of the threat of divine retribution.

Some Tentative Conclusions
Nibley, of course, is not the first or the only one to nOl ice
something like the quarrel between sophic and mantic disposi·
tions. His general theme, as I believe I have demonstrated. has
drawn considerable attention from Leo Strauss and others influ140 Ibid.
141 Ibid. 253; III.
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enced by him. Sophic and mantic dispos itions, from his perspective, ground what others have described in metaphorical language
as a confrontat ion between Jerusalem and Athens. But we have
also noted that this confrontation was alive even within Greek
culture and was identified in Plato's dialogues as a quarrel between philosophy and poetry. In addition, these Straussians tend
to see the atheism in ancient philosophy as much less blatant than
in modernity. Anc ient atheists were not, as are modern atheists,
bold and adventuresome. Why? They believed that the discussion
of divine things is an important beginning element in the quest for
knowledge of First Things. And they also believed that those incapable of knowledge must live by opinion, hence they respected
the beliefs of the communities in which they found themselves.
What may tempt us now to conclude that certain ancient philosophers were partial to or even toyed with mantic things is that they
were shy and retiring in their atheism.
Some have seen in the pantheism of Stoic thought a ringin g
affirmation of the divine, though hardly one congenial with or
resting upon mantic notions or otherwise touching the passions of
bel ievers. But Stoic pantheism is more nearly a form of sentimental atheism couched in language congenial to the uninstru cted.
The closest thing to a conspicuous atheism among ancient philosophers is found in Epicurean thought, and even there some
provision, at least nominally, was made for the gods. 142 One of
the reasons for a lack of candor by ancient philosophers about
divine things may have been the threat of persecution from believers. But the deeper and hence real reason for the cautiou s
treatment of divine things by Greek philosophers, when compared
with the moderns, would see m to be that the ancients did not discoun t the political utility or social significance of faith. Therefore
they made room for the mantic in some entirely subordinate role.
In Plato's case, it was in providing edifying tales of divine retribution to support the laws of a city. But, from the perspective of the
believer, attempts to reduce God to a useful social convention
142 See especially the didactic poem by Lucretius entitled De rerom Miura,
where the gods are placed in the empty space between the worlds and where
reality is reduced entirely to atoms and the void. Whatever their status, the Epicurean gods seem totally uninterested in human matters and, for that matter, incapable of rewarding or punishing human actions.
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must be considered as blasphemous as atte mpts to deny the realit y
of divine things.
When co nfronted with complex and subtle argumentati o n
about di vine things by ancient philosophers, it would seem worthwhile to be at least a little skeptical of what is being sa id. After all ,
it is those same writers who fas len upon us what we know as
natura l theology-that is, what some philosophers think they can
discover by unaided human reason about God. Suc h an ente rprise
may appro priately be symbolized as the wisdom of Athens in
contrast to that of Je ru salem, or as distinct from wh at Nibley sees
as authenti c mantic longin gs.
Leo Strau ss, a secularized Jew whose own way of li fe seems to
have in volved the quest fo r knowledge of First Things by una ided
human reason, argued that philosophy, which term once described
such a radical and unco mpromi sing quest for de monstrab le
knowledge, had a powerfu l competitor in the claim to wisdom that
was be lieved to have been revealed by God to prophets. The ir wisdom was not mere ly the product of una ided human reason, I43
and hence was ult imate ly not be lieved to have been a huma n
manufacture or mere ly a human di scovery.t44
Of course, even among ph ilosophers there were and still are
vast differences over the questi on of what exactly constitutes the
wisdom available to un aided human reason. The philosophic way
of life, for which the metaphor Athe ns seems appropriate, is c haracterized by the assum ption that knowledge of First Things or o f
the highest things can be attained, or is ava ilable to the ex tent th at
suc h th ings are possible, sole ly through human reason. Athe ns
thus symboli zes a quest fo r knowledge of Fi rst Things and not
necessaril y the possession of suc h know ledge; it is a way of li fe
that is Ihought 10 be the hi ghest, most exce llent , or virtuous. O n
the other hand, the wisdom of Jeru salem is be lieved to have its
origin with God and is know n only because and to the extent th at
it has been revealed to an d through prophets.
As useful as the Jeru sa le m-Athens dist inction may be, that way
of setting the matter out also has the tendency to lead to the con 143 See Leo Strauss. "On the Interpretation of Ge nesis," L'f{omme 21/1
(January-March (981): 5-20; reprinted in lewish Philosophy and {he Crisis o[
Modemily, 359- 76.
144 See Strauss, "Progress or Re turn?" 227-70, 28 1.
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elusion that the actual Athens of antiquity housed only those who
sough I for knowledge of First Things so lely through the resources
of the human mind. and that Jerusalem only made a place for
those who followed the prophets and divine revelation. Nibley
strives to show that in antiquily someth ing like those two competing claims to wisdom were found among the Greeks, and not just
among those peoples with biblical roots. And the actual Jerusalem
was, according to Jesus, worthy of divine cursing.
And, we mighl add, something like that ancient religious
slruggle can also be seen taking place wherever secular views are
being pushed by dissidents on the fringes of the church. It occurs,
for example, here and there in the pages of SunJtone and Dialogue, or in the secular ideology at work in much of what gets
published by Signature Press, or when the claims of the restored
gospel are reduced to mere sent imentalities or to the slogans of
advertising copy.
In the prophetic tradition, the giving of reasons is necessarily
subordinated to explicating and defending a wisdom that the believers trust comes from deity. By contrast, in its more radical or
purer and original articulations. tht: philosophic quest looked only
10 the resou rces of the human mind. The JophiJtic is Nibley's
name for the clumsy effort to harmonize the two. And modernity
is the label Strauss used to identify the profound transformation
of the philosophical quest into a system or even an ideology that
presumably makes irrelevant the longing for genuine answers to
what Nibley calls the "Terrib le Questions."
Contrary to what some critics have claimed,145 Nibley has not
been busy providing proofs for the prophetic-he has always
been within the mantic tradition. His has always been a modest
effort fully within the province of the historian. On the other
hand. those anxious to advance a knowledge set within the sophic
tradition would have us believe that science, or at least competent
scholarship. as suc h matters are currently understood, is e ntirely
their business, and that they have all the answers. Nothing could
be further from the truth. Nibley has striven to show that, by providing the plot, the prophetic yields a plausible alternative to
145 For example. see the remarks about Nibley (and others) by Marvin S.
Hill in his 'The 'New Mormon History ' Reassessed in Light of Recent Books on
Joseph Smith and Mormon Origins." Dia/ogut 21/3 (1988): 118-19.

86

FARMS REVIEW OF BQOKS 11/1 (1999)

secular, naturalistic explanations. He has done this with historical
arguments, even though secularized hi storians may not recog nize
them as such or appreciate them when they begin to see what he is
doing. From the point of view of the prophetic, plau sibility is
about as much as is possible . But it is all that is really necessary
for faith. Proofs lurn out to be a chimera Ihat those enthralled with
sophic pride assume is both necessary and possible.
There is still a possibility for what can be called an accommodation. though not a harmonization, of al least some of the fruit of
human reason with divine special revelations as set out in the
sc riptures. But thi s kind of accommodation can only flourish on
terms laid out from the perspective of faith. h will be co rrupting
of faith if some spec ific school or brand of philosophy begins to
call the tune.
The problem for many of those who believe that they possess
a wisdom found in the Bible has been that there really are many
interpretations and hence many ways of understanding divine
things as they are di sclosed in that lex!. What thi s means is that
any particular faith. if it is in any way grounded in the scriptures,
will find itself confronted by other competing brands of faith also
claiming roots in mantic longings, which also make similar appeals to the Bible. And every manifestatio n of mantic longin g will
also face sophic skepticis m concern ing prophetic truth claims.
How can one account for the diversity of religious claims
presu mably resting on an original mantic foundation? From the
perspective of ancient Greek philosophy, it was precisely the
existence of many laws (and lawgi vers) and also many different
gods that made the quest for knowledge by unaided human reason a search for that which stands beneath (or beyond) the opinions, customs, laws, and ways of any actual people.
There is neither a hi gher ground from which one can adjudicate the confl icting affirmations of philosophy, nor a presu ppositionless way to assess the different claims made by those with differing understandings of the Bible. One obvious problem for
those who focu s their mantic longings exclusively on the Bible is
that they deny to themselves (and hence also to others) even the
possibility that what they presumably admire in the Bible can be a
poss ibility in their own lives. This is especially true of certa in recent evange lical or fundamentalist factions of Protestants who in-
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sist on the Bible alone. In place of divine special revelations, which
they flatly deny are possible outside the Bible, they tend to stress
the necessity of an emotional experience of regeneration and in
some instances encourage highly emotional expressions of piety.
And they also read the Bible through a lens provided for them by
theologians dependent upon sophic categories and explanations.
Whether one embraces one of the fashions of recent philosophy or some version of faith in God will ultimately rest on a moral
choice and therefore on an act of faith. Why? As Strauss has
shown, neither claim can be made entirely evidenl. 146 Since we all
must begin 10 act before we can begin to know in any full sense,
we necessarily all live by some faith, even when we dogmatically
deny that this is what we are doing. We should not be ashamed of
our faith . Nor should we hide from ourselves and others that our
choices are ultimately a way of life and hence are moral and not
ever entirely or genuinely theoretical. I prefer what is symbolized
by Jerusalem, with its mantic mood and tradition, and with its prophetic faith. I strive to put my trust in God. I seek to learn from
what I believe are divine revelations precisely because these offer
hope, while the philosophic quest for wisdom-unless its usefu l
moral elements are strictly subordinated to faith in another world
and hence to a wisdom from the heavens that is not merely a human invention--ends with the grave.

146 See Leo Strauss, "Preface to Spinoza's Critique of Religion," in Jewish
Philosophy and the Crisis of Modernity, 170-73. A slightly different version of
this essay ean be found in Strauss, Liberalism: Ancient and Modern, 254-57; the
ori ginal version was also published under the title ··Preface to the English
xTranslation.'· in Strauss's Spinoza's Critique of Religion, 28-31. For my use of
this enigmatic but insightful essay. see Midgley, '1l1e City and Philosophy."
42-46.

